Fisheries resources are typical Common-Pool Resources (CPRs); users of CPRs know that if they used resources less together, they would get the highest collective benefits. Even so, they would go on exploiting resources respectively, trapped in such a dilemma. Since 1960s, the social science community had been thinking about how to solve the tragedy of over-exploitation under Hardin's model, a paradigm which resorts to national legislations or the price mechanism. The paradigm seemed to be shifted in 1990s: Ostrom proposed the 'CPR self-governance of User Groups' theory as another solution.This article started with the conflict of fisheries grounds of flying fish around the Orchid Island, a conflict that the author viewed as the CPRs dilemma. Then the author reexamined CPR self-governance theory and the indigenous institution of fisheries grounds around this island. On the basis of the principle of 'clearly defined boundary principle' proposed by Ostrom, it was found that an enduring self-governance fisheries ground institution could be impacted by the breaking of resources boundaries. In addition, solving this conflict, the government intervened with a new resource boundary which distinguished original and new users. However, the Public Trust Doctrine was not considered by the government.This case also showed that a cross-country or cross-boundary scale of CPR governance should be applied because the flying fish migrated to different places in different phases of their life cycle. Additionally, this case reflected that self-governance was not enough for solving the CPR dilemma. Therefore, it would be an important task in the future to develop such an approach, which accommodates Hardin's and Ostrom's solutions and applies suitable solutions by different scales of governance.