每一次開發工業區後的租售策略成敗，涉及政府對每一個企業設廠機會的掌握，使決策者採取恰好的策略，但這不容易。政府為了順利出售土地而採取價格補貼策略，在台南的實踐卻落入困境也需要進一步討論。緣此，本研究運用新制度經濟學的博弈理論觀點，解釋政府對工業區的治理，究竟促進公私合作的條件是什麼？合作需要怎樣改變制度？而妥善檢視各種制度之間的互補與替代關係是重要的。本研究以台南科技工業區（南科工）為案例，將Hotelling模型延伸為空間博弈的情境，探討企業如何思考進駐南科工的決策？研究結論顯示，首先，政府在工業區治理的分工角色，是建立產業發展的遊戲規則，但它在挑選贏家策略是以高科技產業為目標，使得目標外的企業需求被忽略。其次，政府運用在工業區治理及租售的策略，關注在土地價格補貼策略，忽略了非價格策略，進而使自身陷入租售困境。同時，政府策略確實會影響企業為了優化營運而選擇進駐南科工，而其中新舊顧客的成功轉換是改變區位的關鍵。其三，企業進駐南科工的選址策略，顯示企業追求規模的優化、運用制度互補來發展新機會、以及尋求產業價值鏈的垂直分工與技術進步，是重要的策略思維。

Successful sale/lease of industrial park properties depends on government's ability to attract investors. The reason why the government's subsidy policies failed to facilitate sale/lease of industrial park properties in Tainan Technology Industrial Park (TTIP) should be thoroughly investigated. Therefore, the study explores what institutional changes are required to promote public-private partnerships in industrial park management in terms of game theory. In addition, how institutions complement each other is also discussed. This study takes TTIP as an example and discusses companies' decision to move into TTIP based on an extension of Hotelling's model (spatial game theory). Following are summary of findings and conclusions. First, the government's division of work in industrial park management is the foundation for industry development. Its winning strategies, however, only focus on high-tech companies. Second, the government's industrial park management and property sale/lease strategies attend to land price subsidy but ignore non-pricing strategies, giving rise to dilemma about sale or lease. Meanwhile, government's strategies do influence companies' decision to move into TTIP (to optimize operations) among which customer transfer is key to site selection. Third, companies' site selection strategies in TTIP show their pursuit of optimal scale, use of complementary institutions to develop new business opportunities and seeking for vertical disintegration in value chain and technological progress.