Ramsey, Stich和Garon (1991)論證有些聯結模型支持“命題態度” (''propositional attudes")應被消除的看法。Clark (1993)針對此看法，論證命題態度即 使與“深層起因”(''underlying causes")無關聯，仍可視為"科學可接納的種類” ("scientifically respectable kinds")。他論證命題態度可經由應用“宏觀策略” (“macrostrategy")和“違反事實”(''counterfactual")分析而被“重新發現"。 我論證由於宏觀策略和違反事實分析與深層起因之關聯仍未被確認，故經由這些近路而 被重新發現的種類不應必然視之為科學可接納的。Clark支持深層起因，“微觀策略” (“microstraegies")，的研究和違反事實宏觀策略的研究有同等重要的科學價值，且主張二 者間的互動。我認為他對後者的擁護是太寬厚了。微觀策略可以約束宏觀策略，宏觀策略卻 不一定能約束微觀策略。再者，我論證雖然我們仍未有足夠理由以消除命題態度，但其已受 到很大的質疑。

　　　　　Ramsey, Stich, arid Garon (1991) argue that certain kinds of connectionist models are revolutionary in that they support a thoroughgoing eliminativism toward propositional attitudes. Clark (1993), while conceding that in-the-brain analogues of propositional attitudes may never be found, argues that propositional attitudes may be "rediscovered" through adoption of a "macrostrategy" and through counterfactual highlighting. On Clark's account, propositional attitudes may be regarded as a "scientifically respectable" kind, even if they are not linked to underlying causal mechanisms. He does endorse constraints on the "class of beings' to whom propositional attitudes may appropriately be ascribed and he holds that what we know of brain activity will influence our explanations of behavior, as well as vice versa. Clark acknowledges that this sets up a "tricky dialectic," but still he regards propositional attitude ascriptions as "defeasible." Consideration of difficulties encountered by "coarser analyses" of the "macrostrategy" leads me to be wary of regarding kinds investigated at too great a remove from causal mechanisms as scientifically respectable. Clark's endorsement of constraints on the class of beings who qualify for propositional attitude ascriptions indicates that he is sensitive to these concerns, but I find Clark's "pragmatic" position to be overly generous. Where he speaks of a "tricky dialectic," I am inclined to say that the macrostrategist need be more concerned with micro-level research than the microstrategist need be concerned with macro-level research. Moreover, my view of propositional attitude ascriptions, influenced both by Ramsey, Stich, and Garon's failure to find inner analogues and by doubts about the macro-level explanatory value of such ascriptions is that although the case for eliminativism is not yet strong enough, they should be placed on probation-i.e. though the evidence does not warrant elimination, it does warrant a reduction in their epistemic status.