歷來對亞里斯多德《範疇論》的解釋可以分成三種，即：一、「論理的」（ logical ），二、「萬有論的」（ ontological ），或者，三、既是「論理的」， 同時也 是「萬有論的」。在本文中，筆者跟隨著陳康先生的見解，採取了第三種的解釋可能。在同 一種解釋可能之下，筆者試圖反對陳康先生的一個意見，即：「相與種不僅是對於基體的陳 述，而且也是在基體中的萬有。」筆者認為：在亞里斯多德《範疇論》裡，亞里斯多德只承 認：「相與種是對於基體的陳述」，然而卻不認為：「相與種是在基體中的萬有。」筆者由 「相與種不在基體中是」的主張出發，獲得一個推斷，即：在亞里斯多德《範疇論》裡，相 作為普遍的本質，用來陳述個別的本質，這兩者各為獨立自在的，因而相不在個別事物中有 ，個別事物也不蘊含相，所以，相與個別事物分離。 本文由「分離」一詞的字源學意義作為觀察的出發點，分別討論了柏拉圖《巴曼尼得斯篇》 的分離問題的意義，以及亞里斯多德《物理學以後諸篇》第一卷第六章的「分離」意義為： 「感覺對象在相之旁」最後，在《範疇論》第二章裡，筆者由「在基體中是」應指：「某些 非自在且不能自存的萬有」，而主張相與個別事物既不「在基體中是」，則它們各自獨立， 互相分離。在《範疇論》第五章裡，筆者藉著「第一類本質用於第二類本質而作為其陳述的 可能，第二類本質蘊含第一類本質」的主張而論兩類本質間有一分離。

　　　　　The problem of 'χωρισμοσ' is one of the most meaningful but quasi irresolvable 'αποριαι' in the ancient Greek philosophical topics. In the hermeneutic tradition of Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines, which was founded by German scholars like P. Natorp, Trendelenburg, C. Brandis, H. Bonitz and E. Zeller, it is interpreted as characteristic of Plato's idealism against that Aristotle tried to establish his analytical demonstration in the most plausible form. By Nicolai Hartmann C.-H. Chen wrote his Dissertation <Das Chorismos-problem bei Aristoteles> in that he proposed to challenge the German hermeneutic tradition of platonic-aristotelian Philosophy. In this article I follow his investigation of the problem of 'χωρισμοσ', but I am not content with some points of his interpretation on Aristotle's <The Categories> in his article "On Aristotle's Two Expressions: kαθ' νποkειμενου λετεστηαι and εν νποkειμενωι ειναι Their Meaning in Cat, 2, a20-b9 and the Extension of This Meaning". He claims that 'ειδοσ' and 'γενοσ' are not only predicated of the subject, but also "inesse" in the substratum. It seems absurd to me that 'ειδοσ' and 'γενοσ' are interpreted as "inesse" in the substratum in Aristotle's <The Categories>. I regard <The Categories> Ⅱ and Ⅴ as an evidence and try to prove the thesis--there exists a problem of 'χωρισμοσ' in Aristotle's <The Categories>. If this thesis is apodictically true, C.H. Chen's claim must be false.