一、中文部份
1.王健安，2001，＂不同金融中介體系與公司治理的關係＂，台灣財務金融季刊，2卷4期，頁63-88。
2.王健安，2004，＂危機銀行（公司）事件對其借貸往來公司（銀行）股價的影響＂，證券市場發展，16卷，1期，頁123-164。
3.王健安，2005，＂危機銀行與借貸往來企業的關係：來看中興銀行案例的觀察＂，金融風險管理季刊，1卷，1期，頁1-33。
4.王健安，2007，＂企業與銀行借貸往來存續期間的研究＂，證券市場發展，19卷，2期，頁1-40。
5.王健安、沈中華，2003，＂資訊不對稱環境下，公司投資與銀行融資限制關係之研究＂，管理學報，20卷，4期，頁721-748。
6.利菊秀、劉純之、葉家興，2004，＂論保險市場訊息不對稱理論與實證的不一致性＂，保險專刊，20卷2期，頁99-112。7.吳文清，1992，現代審計學，五版，台灣西書出版社，台北市。
8.吳明隆，2000，SPSS統計應用實務，初版，松崗電腦圖書資料股份有限公司，台北市。
9.吳明隆，2003，SPSS統計應用學習實務－問卷分析與應用統計，初版，台北市：知城數位科技股份有限公司。
10.吳明隆、涂金堂，2006，SPSS與統計應用分析，二版，五南圖書出版股份有限公司，台北市。
11.吳萬益、林清河，2001，企業研究方法，初版，華泰圖書出版公司，台北市。
12.吳萬益、林清河，2002，行銷研究，初版，華泰圖書出版公司，台北市。
13.沈中華、王健安，2001，＂從風險資訊結構的觀點探討銀行經營績效與往來企業的關係＂，存款保險資訊季刊，15卷，2期，頁11-31。14.金融業務統計輯要，2009年，行政院金融監督管理委員會銀行局，3月版，http://www.fscey.gov.tw/news_detail2.aspx?icuitem=881241。
15.俞海琴，1992，資訊不對稱下本國銀行放款市場之研究，國立政治大學企業管理研究所，博士論文。
16.俞海琴、劉維琪，1993，＂固定存款保費制度下，銀行資產品質、資產風險與資本間之關係＂，第2屆證券金融市場之理論與實務研討會，中山大學，頁367-382。
17.俞海琴、劉維琪、林烱垚、陳隆麒，1992，＂資訊不對稱下，借款者型態與放款契約中擔保品、利率間之關係－不連續情況＂，管理評論，頁59-80，11月。
18.張紹勳、張紹評、林秀娟，2000，SPSS for Windows多變量統計分析，二版，松崗電腦圖書資料股份有限公司，台北市。
19.郭敏華，1997，＂銀行對借款人資訊不對稱之衡量＂，世新大學學報，7卷，頁195-217。
20.陳正昌、程炳林，1994，SPSS、SAS、BMDP統計軟體在多變量統計上的應用，五南圖書公司，台北市。
21.陳家彬、賴怡洵，2003，銀行往來關係和授信行為之研究，經濟論文，31卷3期，頁497-539。22.陳順宇，2000，迴歸分析，三版，華泰圖書出版公司，台北市。
23.陳順宇，2005，多變量分析，四版，華泰圖書出版公司，台北市。
24.陳錦村，1997，＂客戶利潤貢獻制度與銀行授信行為＂，臺研金融與投資，13卷，頁22-32。
25.菅瑞昌，2003，＂關係銀行、公司治理與銀行風險承擔行為之研究＂，風險管理學報，5卷3期，頁393-410。
26.黃俊英，1996，企業研究方法，初版，東華書局股份有限公司，台北市。
27.黃俊英，2000，多變量分析，七版，華泰圖書出版公司，台北市。
28.黃俊英，2006，行銷研究概論，四版，華泰圖書出版公司，台北市。
29.黃德舜，1993，負債契約與代理問題之研究，國立政治大學企業管理研究所，博士論文。
30.劉祥熹、陳永琦，2000，＂經營策略、外部環境、組織結構與經營績效之關連性－台灣地區農漁會信用部之實證研究＂，企業管理學報，46期，頁77-114。二、英文部份
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