本論文旨在探討自我在列維納斯的倫理學中如何保有其獨特性及重塑後現代中的人本主義。在倫理關係中，列維納斯認為早在自我意識形成前，自我就有義務面對不可化約的他者，因此，自我是被動的，為他者牽制的。然而，列維納斯的自我並非佛德瑞克．詹姆斯的「主體死亡」或者德勒茲的「游牧主體」所陳述的概念，因後兩者強調的是消逝的、隨機的、暫時的存在狀態。反之，列維納斯的自我是在對他者的責任中，呈現新的可能性且展現獨特性。有趣的是，自我並非建構在先驗的自我中心或任何共通的本質上，而是根基於一個空間化的時間。首先，列維納斯用斷時性（Diachrony）來描述自我和他者無可避免的遭遇及兩者無法統整或化約的關係，其中也喚醒自我對絕對被動性的察覺，但此被動狀態絕非表示停滯或任由擺佈的狀態，而是要求自我必須對他者負責，一個無所推委的義務。弔詭的是，對他者的義務傳達了雙重自我的概念：一為面對他者時被動的我；一為回應他者時主動的我，新的可能性即在此回應中產生。值得注意的是，只有在自我覺察到對他者的義務時，某種自由才能喚起自我新的可能性，而如此的自由並非以絕對理性為依歸（如康得所言），也非指涉某種與生俱來的特質，它是即時回應他者的行動。除了產生新的可能性，這些行動顯示自我的獨特性及不可取代性，重塑後現代的人本主義。在列維納斯的倫理學中，自我雖無可避免地面對不可化約且具壓倒性的他者，但並未消蝕成隨機的存在，而是在檢視自我的被動性及對他者的義務中，展現另類的人性解讀。

This paper aims to explore how the self in Emmanuel Levinas’s ethics retains individuality and reconfigures humanism in the postmodern age. In the ethical relation, the self, pre-consciously obliged by the irreducible and overwhelming Other, is vulnerable and passive. However, the ethical self depicted by Levinas neither corresponds to Jameson Frederic’s notion of “death of the subject” nor Deleuze’s “normadic subject,” characterized by the provisional or contingent state of being. Instead, the self asserts its individuality by bringing up new possibilities in the ethical responsibility for the Other. Without presupposing self-centeredness or any innate essence, the self’s individuality is established in spatialized time. Diachrony is the concept Levinas applies to depict the inevitable confrontation with the nonthematizable Other. It is a dissymmetrical and incommensurable relation with the Other, and the awakening of the self to its radical passivity and vulnerability. However, this passivity does not designate inertia or stasis. It is a state in which, confronted with the Other, a demand is issued that the self be ethically responsible. Paradoxically, the responsibility demonstrates the split of the self into the passive “me” in the Other-confrontation and the active “I” in response to the Other. In addition, this ethical responsibility precedes the freedom through which new possibilities are evoked. Nevertheless, that freedom neither corresponds to any universal reason as Kant contends nor implies an innate quality to be asserted. It is the ability to act now in response to the Other, in a sense remaking the self as new possibilities are registered in the recognition of the self. It is, hence, the registrations of these new possibilities that reconfigure the humanism in the postmodern age. Therefore, Levinas’s ethics, marked by the irreducible and overwhelming Other, does not end up with the self dissolved or diminished to a mere contingency, but confirms a reconfigured humanism derived from an elaborate re-examination of the self’s radical passivity and responsibility.