本文旨在探討影響台北縣針對第七屆立法院選舉所進行的選區重劃之因素。此議題本身高度的政治性以及前所未有的經驗，勢必引發諸多研究者的關注與探究。本文主要關注的問題是該選區劃分工作由誰主導?如何進行?以及影響地方政府還區劃分的主要因素為何?作者採取參與觀察法和新制度主義的途徑進行研究。 本研究主要發現如下：首先，現任的台北縣立法委員在北縣選區劃分過程中是主要的參與者，同時也是縣選委會最大的壓力來源。其次，北縣選委會如同中央選委會，並未承擔地方政府選區劃分的主要責任，而是採取整合各方意見以五案併陳的方式呈報中央選舉委員會。再者，此次北縣地方在選區劃分所表達的主要原則集中在「票票等值」與「共同生活圈」。作者證明二者實難共存。最後，本文發現政黨與現任立委的確有精研選區劃分避戲規則甚至不惜以犯規獲取最大利益。

This study discusses the factors affecting t he constituency redistricting for the 7th Legislative Yuan election in Taipei County. A high1y po1itica1 issue and never practiced before, the first congressional redistricting engenders some interesting phenomenon to observe. With participatory observation and the inspiration of new institutionalism, we try to figure out questions such as "who is responsible for the district drawing and how" and "what are the major factors influencing the process of redistricting in the local level, i.e., Taipei County." We find that incumbent legislators play decisive roles than any others in bringing out the redistricting drafts. Second, the Taipei County Election Commission, Iike the CEC, did not take the direct responsibility of suggesting its preferred redistricting scheme but integrate stakeholders' opinions into five drafts and put the hot potato back to the CEC. Third, the dominant princip1es expressed in the local level for constituency redistricting are "equal value of the vote" and "common living circle." Nonetheless, there is a trade-off between the two principles. Finally, although not covered in this paper, we have noticed that the rule of the redistricting game had been somewhat abused by some political parties and incumbents, a fact that can be understood from the perspective of the new institutionalism.