Before the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) founded the People’s Republic of China (PRC), it used a “trio system” in which the Communist Party built a coalition government with other parties and political groups. In the theory of the “doctrine of new democracy,” although the leadership of the party was paramount, the participation of other classes was also stressed. In other words, before the PRC was established, there was some kind of “logic of the republic”, that is, a logic directed by the will of people and regulated by the norms provided by the constitution. Article II of the constitution of the PRC also stipulates that: “All power in the People's Republic of China belongs to the people.” According to this article, the People’s Congresses at various levels exert supreme power. However, in reality, the CCP is the actual power holder. Usually, the “logic of the party-state” overrides the “logic of the republic”, since the CCP holds real supreme power. Officials are ultimately accountable not to the People’s Congress, but to the party committee. More interestingly, there have been emerging signs of a return of the “logic of the republic” in recent years. There are several driving forces behind these signs. The first is the appearance of the “constitutionalism argument,” which takes seriously the constitutionally stipulated state institutions of the PRC. For example, the supervision function of the People’s Congress has been emphasized. Another is the awakening of the consciousness regarding citizens’ rights, and the growing influence of the internet in spreading information. These two factors have prompted increasing mass protests and other non-institutional political participation. In facing these challenges, government officials not only have to be accountable to the party, but also to respond to citizens’ demands. However, the party-state has been clearly aware that these changes constitute potential challenges to the “logic of party-state.” The party-state has responded with flexibility on occasions, but ultimately it has resolutely defended its monopoly on power and right to make ultimate political decisions. This article will explore this phenomenon through discussion of several cases of constitutional change. The findings of this article will be put into a dialogue with existing literature on the contemporary Chinese state and regime in order to shed more light on the possible paths of the future transition of China’s authoritarian party-state regime.