In the wake of the Anti-Japanese War, the peace negotiations between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had three stages the first began with direct bilateral talks in Chongking from August to October 1945, followed by the second one on the convocation of the Political Consultative Conference (PCC) in January 1946 resulting in the Manchurian cease fire agreement, and the third one was reconvened from July to October when the KMT army seized Zhangjiajie. The first stage bore no fruit but a three-month war; while the second stage witnessed the results produced in the first were simply overturned; as to the last stage, it turned out to be doomed to failure as a smokescreen of violent battles. The whole series of peace talks underwent a circuitous and complex process, revealing the CCP called for ”supporting Chairman Chiang Kai-shek's leadership” in Chungking on the one hand, and Mao Zedong declared ”the task of overthrowing Chiang” towards the end on the other. This paper explores foul relevant issues; Firstly, Mao's target at North and Northeast China through Chungking talks; secondly, the ceasefire agreement generated by the U.S. acknowledging Chiang's armed forces to take over Northeast China; thirdly, the discrete responses from the KMT and CCP to the PCC resolutions; and fourthly, the CCP's ”hidden agenda” in the army reorganization plan. Mainly in a spirit of mutual understanding and accommodation, the six-month KMT-CCP talks from August 28, 1945 to February 25, 1946 reached on three major agreements: a general truce, the PCC five resolutions, and the army reorganization plan. Despite the eventual failure to implement the agreements, they were largely approved and shed light on China's unification. Both the KMT and the CCP were willing to commit themselves at that time. What led to the opposite outcome is well-worth a close examination. The two parties blamed each other for the breakdown of the agreements. In the statement issued upon his departure from China, the U.S. special envoy General George Marshall claimed, ”The greatest obstacle to peace has been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang regard each other.” The crucial factors involved, as Marshall indicated, were bilateral: On the side of the KMT, a dominant group of reactionaries was opposed to almost every effort; on the side of the CCP, some ”radicals” never hesitated to gain their end by the most drastic measures. Regardless of the costs in the sufferings to the Chinese people, the Communists counted on an economic collapse to bring about the fall of the government, as accelerated, for instance, by guerilla actions against traffic. Given that all of the above points of view could somehow be justified by respective parties involved in their deadly struggle, there arguably existed sophisticated, multi face ted reasons for the breakdown of the three major agreements. However, the most important factor of all should be the confrontation between the two superpowers, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, which exacerbated the KMT-CCP conflict. The Marshall mission succeeded in persuading Chiang to fight his way into the Northeast, leading to the deterioration of the KMT-Soviet relations. This arguably gravest decision blunder came to haunt Chiang for the rest of his life, for it was in the Northeast that his troops fell and the strongest cause for reaching the KMT-CCP reconciliation was finally and irretrievably lost.