根據日本－印尼EPA，日本自2008年起開放來自印尼的護士、看護工作人員赴日工作，而根據日本－菲律賓EPA，則是自2009年起開放。申請者仍需通過日本的國家考試，才能取得護士與看護的資格。然而，對於外籍人士而言，以日文通過日本的國家考試仍然是極高的門檻，目前錄取率非常之低。對於此一主題，許多先前研究的主要結論，是批評日本並未真正考慮國際間專業勞工的平衡移動，而由於很明顯的，對外籍人士而言以日文進行考試過於困難，開放申請其實只不過是日方為了順利簽訂EPA的一種手段而已。不同於過往的研究，本文嘗試以Putnam的Two-level-game理論，分析此一方案並釐清相關問題，並探討Level 1（國際協商）與Level 2（國內之批准）間的交互作用。為了在Level 1產生足夠廣闊之win-sets，要求申請者通過日文的國家考試亦為無可避免之條件。本文亦探討Level 1協商會改變國內政策，EPA也使得封閉的日本勞動市場注入了一股活水。

Under its Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with Indonesia and the Philippines, Japan began accepting nurse and care worker candidates from Indonesia and the Philippines in 2008 and 2009, respectively. However, applicants are required to pass national exams in order to obtain qualification for nursing and even care worker's job in Japan. As taking the national exams in Japanese is extremely difficult for trainees from overseas, their passing rate remains very low. Many previous studies on this subject have focused on critical arguments that the Japanese government did not consider the internationally balanced mobility of skilled laborers, and that the acceptance scheme for foreign health-care workers was used as a trade-off to conclude the EPAs. By challenging these previous studies, this paper attempts to analyze the acceptance scheme under the framework of Putnam's two-level game theory, exploring the interaction between Level I (an international negotiation) and Level II (domestic process for ratification). To make the win-win situations of both countries large enough to be overlapped on Level I negotiations, the condition requiring foreign applicants to pass the national exam in Japanese was unavoidable. This paper also explores how Level 1 bargaining has provided an impetus to change the internal system.