This paper aims to explore the Nationalist government’s reactions to Japanese military actions in China, focusing on the process from the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7, 1937 to the Nine Powers Agreement Convention held on November 24, 1937. The author also explores the Chinese government’s proposal to the international alliance by using latest discovery of archives and diaries of Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Shih-chieh and Hsu Yung-chang. Briefly speaking, Chiang Kai-shek’s declaration of war on Japan was made on multiple conditions including war preparations including the battle already fought, domestic cooperation and international assistance achieved, while simultaneous negotiations with some high ranking officials such as Wang Ching-wei, H. H. Kung, and T. V. Soong concluded. As the war against Japan already broke out in northern China, Chiang Kaishek deemed that an all-out war was inevitable while Wang Ching-wei believed that the ally between the Nationalist Government and Russia would strengthen the CCP. Chiang accepted Wang’s such opinion, therefore, he established an alliance with Russia and simultaneously also sought sympathy and assistance from major Western Powers like the United Kingdom and America. In addition, the Nine Powers Agreement Convention, held in Brussels on November 3, 1937 and concluded on November 24, vaguely declared that Japanese military action was a war on and to China. The Nationalist government thus withdrew its capital from Nanking to Chungching on November 20, 1937, showing its determination of long resistance to Japan in battle. Both situations, the move of Capital and the Nine Powers Agreement Convention clearly ended the five-month “quasi-war” situation after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, and defined the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War and projected various hints foreshadowing issues to be found in later developments in China’s wartime responsibilities and ever changing international situations.