寇斯視政府為一家「超級公司」，孫中山亦以「股東與總辦」說明權能區分的政 治關係。儘管一般以為制衡原則是民主憲政中不可動搖的支柱之一，兩者都隱約地質疑制衡 的必要。政府組織運作牽涉的不僅是官員與國會議員間的交易成本，也牽涉到人民與官員或 國會議員之間的交易成本。從財產權與交易成本的角度分析，本文闡明:民主政體的政府組 織可以有不同的型態，而制衡原則與權能區分原則是對這二種交易成本做不同強調的兩種政 府組織設計。除了為權能區分的政府組織構想找到交易成本的理論基礎外，本文更得到一個 可以驗證的命題:其他條件不變下，交通、通訊、與傳播事業愈發達，則政府組織會相對地 採取愈多權能區分的設計，或愈少制衡機制的設計。

　　　　　Ronald Coase views government as a super firm. Sun Yat-Sen used stockholders and a general manager to explain his distinction of 'rights and ability' in political affairs. Though check-and-balance is commonly viewed as a tenet of constitutional democracy they apparently would doubt it. Transaction costs occur between bureaucrats and representatives, as well as between them and the masses. In the framework of a property rights approach and transaction cost analysis, the article elucidates that there can be different forms of democratic government. In this light, check-and- balance and rights-and-ability are two government forms targeting different transaction costs. In addition to finding a transaction cost theory for Sun's government form, the article obtains a testable proposition. With other things unchanged, there will be fewer check-and-balance mechanisms and clearer separation of decision control and decision management powers when progress in transportation, telecommunications and mass media is being made.