為了預防與改善環境退化，或為了促進資源永續利用，決策者必需尋求有效的政策工具來實現這些目標。相對於命令控制取向的行政管制，市場取向或誘因基礎的政策工具一般被經濟學家視為是達成環境目標較有效的方式，但此種管理取向經常難以處理環境不確定的課題。由於環境係統的複雜性，導致科學研究者對於環境退化的相互相係仍難提供完全有效與可信的答案予決策者，因而影響理性決策的有效性。近年來，許多國家採取「預警原則」來回應環境複雜系統導致環境不確定的課題，然而此種管理取向，經常缺乏有效的誘因促使潛在環境損害者自動修正他們的行為，以朝向對環境友善的方向進行。為了改善這種兩難困境，必需有新的管理取向來回應此現象，連結污染者付費原則與預警原則的「預警污染付費原則」便是此理念下的產物，在此理念下污染者不僅需支付已知的損害成本，而且需為不確定的損害負責。本文以此管理取向為思考主軸，納入後常態科學與最小安全標準理念，界定預警環境保證金制度的適用範圍，並利用交易成本相關概念，探討預警環境保證金制度的內涵，並提出預警環境保證金制度於土石流災害管理可思考的方向。

In order to prevent and eliminate environmental degradation, or promote sustainable resource use, policymakers must seek to effective regulatory instruments to realize these objectives. Economists have for long argued that the market-based incentives approach is more efficient than one based on command-and-control. The market-based incentives approach is, however, no longer appropriate as we come to deal with environmental degradation issues under uncertainty. In response to the uncertainty inherent in environmental degradation issues, it have been suggested that they be deal with using the “precautionary principle”. But the precautionary principle approach provides environmental resources users with little effective incentives to modify their behavioral patterns in environmentally friendlier directions. An innovative approach currently being researched to manage the environmental uncertainty is “precautionary pollute pays principle” (4P), which is an extension of the polluter pays principle to the polluter pays for uncertainty as well. This paper uses the approach (4P) and incorporates the “post-normal science”, “safe minimum standard”, and “transaction costs” paradigms to discuss a precautionary environmental deposit-refund bonding system in the management of environmental degradation under uncertainty.