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題名:董事監察人責任保險在公司治理角色及與會計師審計意見之關係
作者:林淑玲
作者(外文):Shu-Lin Lin
校院名稱:逢甲大學
系所名稱:商學研究所
指導教授:江向才
學位類別:博士
出版日期:2012
主題關鍵詞:審計報告董事監察人暨重要職員責任保險公司治理corporate governanceDirector and officer liability insuranceauditor reports
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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本文以股權結構、董監責任、經理人角色及企業社會責任等公司治理特性及會計師特質分析對企業購買董事監察人責任保險(D&O)的影響,及探討與會計師出具負面審計意見關係。我們發現公司治理特性確實影響董事監察人責任保險之需求,尤其董事監察人之股權質押及其持股低於最低法定成數和保險需求及會計師負面審計意見都具有顯著正向關係。整體而言,無投保公司相對於有投保公司有較佳的公司治理機制,故對D&O保險需求較低。有投保的公司雖其公司治理結構較弱,但其卻藉由委任產業專家會計師或四大事務所執行審計工作,以彌補其治理制度的缺失,實證結果說明公司投保D&O保險不但強化外部治理機制,同時會計師也對有投保公司所編製的財務報表給予較佳評價。換言之,董事監察人責任保險,對管理階層有監督效果,對會計師審計意見決策具有正面意涵,與產業專家會計師間存在替代效果。
This paper uses corporate governance characteristics as well as auditor traits to analyze the impact of the purchase of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance). The results indicate that corporate governance affects the demand for D&O insurance; in particular, the pledged shares and insufficient shareholdings of directors and supervisors are significantly positively correlated to insurance demand and negative audit opinions. Companies without insurance have better corporate governance mechanisms compared to those with insurance. Although the corporate governance of companies with insurance is comparatively weaker, these companies compensate for the inadequacy of their governance mechanisms by inviting industrial specialists and Big 4 firms. The empirical results suggest that D&O insurance can strengthen external governance. Meanwhile, auditors will provide better evaluations of the financial statements prepared by companies with D&O insurance. In other words, D&O insurance has supervision effects on management and substitute effects on industrial experts.
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