本文旨在探討對垂直限制之執法規範，冀由比較各國競爭法規範核心，檢討我國公平交易法立法原則與執法立場。 維持轉售價格，鑑於其行為本身即有高度公平競爭阻礙性，故各國法制成採當然違法原則。至於垂直非價格限制，其對市場競爭利弊兼具，爰各國法制洵依合理原則判斷。 我國現行公平交易法第十八條規定，尚未就維持轉售價格課以不作為義務之禁止；故立法上似有悖於對維持轉售價格應採嚴格禁止之立法趨勢。另就垂直非價格限制，同法第十九條第六款使用限制競爭或妨礙公平競爭之虞、不正當等不確定法律概念，雖亦屬合理原則之違法判斷；惟於衡量當事人之市場地位上，並未類似外國法制之具體揭示一量的判斷標準，故規範上能仍屬欠缺法律明確性。 為符合立法趨勢，現行公平交易法第十八條，實應改採嚴格禁止規範。至於非價格限制，除應就當事人之市場地位訂出所謂量的判斷基準外；倘進一步考量規範之明確性，亦宜訂定相關經銷契約於公平交易法之適用原則。其次，垂直限制既屬限制競爭法規範體系，爰建議現行公平交易法第十八條及第十九條相關條文，應納入第二章，並改章名為限制競爭。

This article purports to examine the enforcement of punishment of vertical restraints, in hopes that though the comparison of the competition laws of certain other countries, the legislative principles and the position of the government of the Republic of China in the enforcement of its Fair Trade Law ("FTL") can be examined. Considering that resale price maintenance is by itself an act that highly obstructs fair competition, the legal systems of most of other countries have invariably followed the doctrine that resale price maintenance is "per se illegal" Under the legal system of most of other countries, whether imposing vertical non-price restraints constitutes a violation of law is determined on the "rule of reason" , in the consideration that it has its advantages and disadvantages for market competition purposes. Article 18 of the Republic of China FTL provides that resale price maintenance is prohibited in principle, though no prohibitive "inaction oblation" is imposed. Moreover, the proviso of the first paragraph of the same article, which as an exception permits daily necessities dealers to resale price maintenance, appears to be going against the legislative trend of strictly prohibiting the practice. Meanwhile, concerning the vertical non-price restraints, Article 19 (6) of the FTL is based on such vague legal concepts as "likely to constitute an obstruction of fair competition" and "improper practice." Although those concepts appear to smack of making judgment based on the "rule of reason.", the FTL seems to be not exact enough as it, unlike its counterpart of other countries, fails to set forth the exact "quantitative" judgment criteria, in particular when it is a matter involving the "market position" of the parties. To be in line with the current legislative trend, it is imperative that Article 18 of the ROC FTL be revised to strictly prohibit business operators from resale price maintenance. As to the vertical non-price restraints, the market position of the parties concerned should be taken into account and the so-called "quantitative" judgment criteria established. For further preciseness of the regulation, it would be advisable if the conditions under which distributorship agreements are governed by the FTL can be prescribed. Furthermore, since imposing vertical restraints is a kind of unfair competition practice that should be cracked own, it is proposed that both Articles 18 and 19 of the existing FTL be revised to be incorporated in ChapterⅡ, with the title thereof changed into "Competition Restriction." In terms of the effect of law enforcement and weighting the significance of said effect for criminal policy purposes, the FTL is proposed to include a new provision to hold those guilty of resale price maintenance criminally liable at law. Moreover, it appears necessary that before administrative action is taken to punish those guilty of imposing vertical non-price restraints, all lines of business be urged to rectify themselves so that the normalcy and flexibility of market and marketing shall not be prejudiced. Further, imposing vertical restraints also involves price-combination. Transaction denials, abuse of monopoly and other deceits sufficient to disrupt the trading order or acts that appear unfair, for which whether articles conflict, absorber supplement on another should be considered to ensure proper law can be chosen to govern.