This paper first applies strategic planning model under the game theoretic framework to analyze the "One China" dilemma of the current cross Taiwan Strait relations. It indicates that the current political conflict between Taiwan and the Mainland China is in a state of Nash Equilibrium-there is both sides could implement no better alternative strategies unless some of the external conditions change. It further analyzes the "One China" strategies from China's, Taiwan's and "Taiwan Independence's" prospective using simplified strategic planning cases. It shows unambiguously that the current China policies exercised by President Chen's government are mainly of short-term tactical nature, they are unlikely able to make any significatnt impact on China's strategic stance of "One Country Two Systems". The analysis also suggests that it is unlikely China would ever alter its position of using military power as her last resort if Taiwan declares independence. Because that "threatening" strategy would work only if china makes every principal stakeholders (Taiwan as well as U.S.A., Japan, etc.) to believe that China is fully committed to it indeed. The paper therefore suggests that the least-cost solution, both socially and politically, is to avoid the political and ideological showdown (of sovereignty issues, for instance) and move on to pragmatic issues. The paper thus proposes a "win-win" strategy of espousing an adaptive and open-ended process toward the economic integration of Hong Kong, Macao, the Chinese Mainland, and Taiwan (the so called Greater China). Using experiences of North American Free Trade Agreement and the European Union as analogies, this paper estimates that it would take about another thirty years for both sides of the Taiwan Strait to consolidate their economic systems as well as their social structures.