本文主要以康德《判斷力批判》第二耜皆為依據，提討康德之自然科學哲學。先前並簡述其在《純粹理性批判》與《自然科學的形上學基礎》中對自然科學尊基的處理：在前者的著作裡康德尚主要對一般經驗對象探討其可能的條件，在後者康德則進一步處理自然科學對象的奠基問題，但它們皆與《判斷力批判》從理論理性超越偌實踐理性與目的論探究路徑不同。 在針對《判斷力批判》中所著眼的自然目的與極終目的課題，以探討理性理念為自然科學的基礎之前，本文更要先從亞里斯多德形上學思想中，指出一些類似的目的概念與類似的問題，以見康德對亞里斯多德的承續與獨特進展之一面。 本文最後將回顧康德以前的自然科學哲學思潮，以見康德在自然科學哲學史中的地位；並概述自然科學哲學的現象學觀點，以提出對目的性自然去掌握的另一種可能性。

　　　　　This paper is to discuss Kant's philosophy of natural science in relation to the second part of his Critique of judgment. We first summarize the treatment about the foundation of natural science in Critique of Pure Reason and Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science: in the former work, Kant still discussed the possible conditions about the objects of general experiences; in the latter, he further dealt with the foundations of the objects of natural science. But these two works deviated from the approach of Critique of Judgment, which was no longer confined to theoretical reason but entered the realm of practical reason and teleology. Before we concentrate on the natural goal and the ultimate goal, emphasized in Critique of Judgment, to explore the foundation of natural science in the ideal of reason, we would point to similar ideas of goals and parallel issues in Aristotle's metaphysics to show Kant's inheritance and unique development of Aristotle. Finally, we will review earlier thoughts about natural science to show Kant's importance in the history of the philosophy of natural science; besides, we will summarize the phenomenological views about the philosophy of natural science to suggest another possibility to comprehend the nature of purposiveness.