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題名：相對績效評估與高階主管薪酬：論產業競爭程度之影響
書刊名：管理評論
作者：蔡柳卿 引用關係
作者(外文)：Tsai, Liu-ching
出版日期：2006
卷期：25:1
頁次：頁69-94
主題關鍵詞：代理理論；相對績效評估；高階主管薪酬；Agency theory；Relative performance evaluation；Top executive compensation
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
相關次數：
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(16) 博士論文(2) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:16
  • 共同引用共同引用:132
  • 點閱點閱:182
過關於相對績效評估(relative performance evaluation; RPE)的研究並無定論。本研究聚焦於高階主管薪酬契約，旨在探討公司決定高階主管薪酬時是否採用RPE？以及產業競爭性是否影響RPE的運用程度？本研究以1996年至2001年間的臺灣上市以司進行分析，結果發現，產業績效指標與薪酬間具有負向關係，惟並不顯著；而隨著產業立爭程度愈大(小)，產業績效指標的負向薪酬權數愈大(小)。此結果顯示，並無強烈證據支持RPE的採用係存在於所有公司，但隨著競爭程度愈大，RPE有用性愈高，因而受到採用的程度也愈大，此與代理理論(Holmstrom 1982)的預期一致。本研究最後發現非家族控制之公司相對於家族家控制公司而言，依產業競爭性採用RPE的程度更強，顯示RPE理論在國內公司的適用情況，須視是否屬家族控制型態而定。
Although economic theory provides a storing rationale for relative performance evaluation (RPE) based on risk-sharing, empirical research finds little support for the RPE hypothesis in executive compensation. Recently, Defond & Park (1999) report that RPE is more useful in CEO dismissal decisions for U.S. firms facing more competitive environments. However, there is still little evidence concerning the application of RPE in emerging markets such as Taiwan. accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the average Taiwanese top executives are rewarded on the basis of relative performance, and whether industry competition affects the degree of emphasis on RPE. Using a sample of Taiwanese listed firms, this study finds that there is little RPE for average top executives, but provides storing evidence supporting the argument that as the degree of industry competition is higher, RPE-based performance receives more emphasis in executive compensation. Moreover, this phenomenon is particularly prominent for non-family controlled firms, indicating RPE theory is suitable mainly for non-family controlled firms in Taiwan.
期刊論文
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11.Finkelstein, S.、Hambrick, Donald C.(1989)。Chief executive compensation: A study of the intersection of markets and political processes。Strategic Management Journal，10(2)，121-134。  new window
12.Geletkanycz, M. A.、Hambrick, D. C.(1997)。The External Ties of Senior Executives: Implications for Strategic Choice and Performance。Administrative Science Quarterly，42，654-681。  new window
13.Holmström, Bengt(1982)。Moral Hazard in Teams。The Bell Journal of Economics，13(2)，324-340。  new window
14.楊朝旭(20040400)。產品市場競爭可否降低公司內部治理機制不佳所導致的代理成本？。管理學報，21(2)，153-173。new window  延伸查詢new window
15.Feltham, G. A.、Xie, J.(1994)。Performance Measure Congruity and Diversity in Multi-task Principal/Agent Relations。The Accounting Review，69(3)，429-453。  new window
16.Allen, M. P.(1981)。Power and privilege in the large corporation: Corporate control and managerial compensation。American Journal of Sociology，86(5)，1112-1123。  new window
17.Claessens, Stijn、Djankov, Simeon、Lang, Larry H. P.(2000)。The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations。Journal of Financial Economics，58(1/2)，81-112。  new window
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19.Lambert, Richard A.、Larcker, David F.、Weigelt, Keith(1993)。The Structure of Organizational Incentives。Administrative Science Quarterly，38(3)，438-461。  new window
20.Banker, Rajiv D.、Datar, Srikant M.(1989)。Sensitivity, precision, and linear aggregation of signals for performance evaluation。Journal of Accounting Research，27(1)，21-39。  new window
21.Finkelstein, Sydney、Boyd, Brian K.(1998)。How Much Does the CEO Matter? The Role of Managerial Discretion in the Setting of CEO Compensation。Academy of Management Journal，41(2)，179-199。  new window
22.Holmström, Bengt、Milgrom, Paul R.(1987)。Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives。Econometrica，55(2)，303-328。  new window
23.Morck, Randall、Yeung, Bernard、Yu, Wayne(2000)。The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why Do Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?。Journal of Financial Economics，58(1/2)，215-260。  new window
24.Murphy, Kevin J.、Zimmerman, Jerold L.(1993)。Financial Performance Surrounding CEO Turnover。Journal of Accounting and Economics，16(1-3)，273-315。  new window
25.Defond, Mark L.、Park, Chul W.(1999)。The Effect of Competition on CEO Turnover。Journal of Accounting and Economics，27(1)，35-56。  new window
26.Xie, Biao、Davidson, Wallace N. III、DaDalt, Peter J.(2003)。Earnings Management and Corporate Governance: The Role of the Board and the Audit Committee。Journal of Corporate Finance，9(3)，295-316。  new window
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29.Core, John E.、Holthausen, Robert W.、Larcker, David F.(1999)。Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance。Journal of Financial Economics，51(3)，371-406。  new window
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32.Hölmstrom, Bengt(1979)。Moral Hazard and Observability。The Bell Journal of Economics，10(1)，74-91。  new window
33.Sloan, Richard Geoffrey(1993)。Accounting earnings and top executive compensation。Journal of Accounting and Economics，16(1-3)，55-100。  new window
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36.林穎芬、劉維琪(20030400)。從高階主管薪酬的研究探討代理理論在臺灣的適用程度。管理學報，20(2)，365-395。new window  延伸查詢new window
37.Rhoades, Stephen A.(1993)。The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index。Federal Reserve Bulletin，79(3)，188-189。  new window
38.Lambert, Richard A.、Larcker, David F.(1987)。An Analysis of the Use of Accounting and Market Measures of Performance in Executive Compensation Contracts。Journal of Accounting Research，25(Suppl.)，85-125。  new window
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42.Choudhury, N.(1986)。Responsibility Accounting and Controllability。Accounting and Business Research，17，189-198。  new window
43.Dye, R. A.(1992)。Relative Performance Evaluation and Project Selection。Journal of Accounting Research，30(1)，27-52。  new window
44.Frederickson, J.(1992)。Relative Performance Information: The Effects of Common Uncertainty and Contract Type of Agent Effort。The Accounting Review，67(4)，647-669。  new window
45.Kren, L.(2000)。Common Uncertainty Effects on the Use of Relative Performance Evaluation for Corporate Chief Executives。Advances in Accounting，19(1)，119-138。  new window
研究報告
1.Milliron, Jennifer(2000)。Board of director incentive alignment and the design of executive compensation contracts。University of Chicago。  new window
2.Core, J. E.(1997)。The Directors and Officers Insurance Premium: An Outside Assessment of the Cost of Weak Corporate Governance。The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania。  new window
3.Cyert, R.、Kang, S.、Kumar, P.、Shah, A.(1997)。Corporate Governance and the Level of CEO Compensation。0。  new window
4.Kim, J.(1996)。Additional Evidence on Relative Performance Evaluation Hypothesis。Pittsburgh, PA：Carnegie Mellon University。  new window
學位論文
1.吳政穎(2000)。我國上市公司股權集中度、薪酬設計與公司經營績效關係之研究(博士論文)。國立政治大學。new window  延伸查詢new window
2.曾玉潔(2000)。我國高階主管薪酬決定因素之實証研究(碩士論文)。國立中正大學。  延伸查詢new window
3.吳晶瑩(2013)。公司薪酬委員會制度、高階主管酬勞、與公司績效之關聯性(碩士論文)。國立高雄應用科技大學。  延伸查詢new window
圖書論文
1.Murphy, K. J.(1999)。Executive compensation。Handbook of Labor Economics。Elsevier。  new window
 
 
 
 
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