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題名:公司治理之資訊揭露程度對公司績效之影響效果:利用台灣證交所資訊揭露評鑑系統之實證
作者:王弘志
作者(外文):Wang, Hung Chih
校院名稱:國立中正大學
系所名稱:企業管理研究所
指導教授:劉亞秋博士
王明昌博士
學位類別:博士
出版日期:2015
主題關鍵詞:公司治理資訊揭露資訊揭露評鑑系統公司績效corporate governancetransparency and disclosureInformation Transparency and Disclosure Ranking Systemfirm performance
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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本研究使用證基會資訊揭露評鑑系統,對台灣股市上市櫃公司的評鑑評分,驗證其是否影響公司績效?以2005-2013年接受評鑑評分公司的Panel data進行實證,研究結果顯示,一、公司資訊揭露評鑑程度透明愈高(低),企業經營績效Tobin’s Q 與 ROA相對較佳(差);二、前後期期間「資訊揭露評鑑評分」正向變動,對企業績效具有正向顯著性。顯示資訊揭露評鑑系統評分制度,對公司績效具有顯著影響。
The aims of this study use the results of Information Transparency and Disclosure Ranking System to evidence the performance of the firms in Taiwan Stock Market. The empirical results indicate that using the panel data samples of firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and Over The Counter (OTC) from 2005 to 2013, we significantly find the firms with more (less) transparent and the better (worse) performance after the ranking system result reports evidence from their Tobin’s Q and ROA. Furthermore, we examine and find the companies with positive implement the ranking indicate causes the more positive performance of our samples, significantly. There’re means the Information Transparency and Disclosure Ranking System ranking result can be refer to the firm performance, and the progress in companies’ disclosure significantly positive association with the value relevance of earnings.
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