歐洲人權法院為了在相對立的人權普世性與文化相對性間尋求適當的平衡關係，發展出國家裁量餘地原則，在某些事務各會員國間尚未有共識，並無統一標準前，容許國家在立法或執法時保留較大的自行裁量空間。國家裁量餘地原則是由歐洲人權法院從實務中發展出來的，其理論基礎在於，因為國家當局直接而連續接觸本國事務，事實上應該比國際法院更深入瞭解本國狀況，更有能力對國家資源條件與確實需要做正確評估與判斷。它是由輔助性原則自然衍生的成果，在上下兩層政府分配權力時，原則上應由最接近人民之國家政府負主要治理責任。本論文探索歐洲人權法院適用國家裁量餘地原則之起源、發展，並檢討歐洲人權法院適用此原則之利弊得失。

In consideration of deeply rooted historical and cultural differ-ences among the member states, and in order to sustain diversity of values, the European Court of Human Rights developed the doctrine of the national margin of appreciation. This doctrine states that in some special areas, particularly where there is no consensus among member states, the Court should give way to a member state’s discretion in enacting or enforcing its laws. In doing so, it attempts to find a balance between the universality of human rights and cultural relativism. The margin of appreciation doctrine has grown in usage because it is seen to be a flexible tool with which to integrate competing in-terests within a system that divides power between international and national authorities. It is a natural evolution of the principle of sub-sidiarity, which means that in order to achieve democracy and efficacy, lower levels of government should rule. In our case, this is because national authorities, which are in direct and continuous contact with their people, and are therefore better able to know, assess and judge issues of national concern than more remote levels of governance. In our case, the European Court of Human Rights plays a role subsidiary to that of member states, standing aside and supervising; stepping in only in need. This paper probes the origin and development of the national margin of appreciation doctrine applied by the European Court of Human Rights, and assesses the costs and benefits of such an application.