本文之研究目的旨在探究總經理股票誘因薪酬契約中，會計與市場面績效衡量指標之相對重要性是否受到公司特性之影響，其中公司特性包含公司潛在成長機會、規模、風險、與財務槓桿程度。研究結果顯示總經理股票誘因薪酬與績效之相對敏感性隨著公司特性之不同而有所差異。 當公司愈具有潛在成長機會或規模愈大時，會計衡量指標與總經理股票薪酬水準間之相對敏感性愈低；而當公司愈具有潛在成長機會時，市場衡量指標與總經理股票薪酬水準之相對敏感性雖不顯著，然市場衡量指標與總經理股票薪酬變動程度之相對敏感性顯著提升，此亦顯示出總經理薪酬之衡量，以水準與變動兩型態所得之經濟意涵不盡相同。另一方面，當公司風險愈大或財務槓桿使用程度愈高時，會計衡量指標與總經理股票薪酬水準間之相對敏感性顯著提高；而當公司風險愈高時，總經理股票薪酬與市場衡量指標之相對敏感性降低，此似乎說明當環境不確定性愈高時，總經理所需承擔之風險亦較高，其對於風險因素之考量可能遠高於誘因因子，此時公司應降低外部績效（如市場績效）與薪酬之連結，而以內部績效（會計績效）之連結予以替代。

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the relative importance of accounting and market performance measures in executive stock-based compensation contracts would be affected by corporate characteristics, such as the growth opportunity, size, risk and financial leverage of the corporation. Our results show that the President's stock-based compensation reacts differently to accounting and market performance measures when considering corporate characteristics. We also find that the change-form and level-form of model specification may have different implications. For firms with higher growth opportunity and larger size, the accounting performance measure would have lower sensitivity in the level of the President's stock-based compensation. Further, for firms with a more uncertain environment and higher financial leverage, the accounting performance measure would have higher sensitivity in the level of the President's stock-based compensation. Conversely, for firms with larger size and higher uncertainty, market performance measure would have lower sensitivity in the level of the President's stock-based compensation. These findings indicate that corporations would substitute the internal accounting performance measure for external market performance measure to evaluate the President's actions when they face greater uncertainty of the external environment and debtholders.