在疆界流動快速或「去疆界化」的後現代社會，隨著科技及媒體的高度發展，傳統「人文主義」或「人類中心論」所強調的「人」的自主性及（疆界）完整性正受到嚴峻的挑戰。傅柯所謂的「人已死」或晚近逐漸興起的「後人類」論述正是以「人」所遭受的挑戰及「去疆界化」為立足點。但「去疆界化」或對「他者」的不斷開（解）放是否就該是後現代主體的終極倫理？在後現代「開放的」社會中，各種之前受到壓抑的「他者」或慾望都可隨時隨地得到解放，但矛盾的是，慾望橫流的結果，其角色卻逐漸由挑戰社會體制的抵抗力量演變為社會體制的一部分，成了一種「強制的慾望」（the imperative to enjoy），而失去解放的功能。狄博（Guy Debord）曾經提出「表像社會」（society of the spectacle）的概念，認為在媒體掌控的社會中，由於層次的崩解或去疆界化，社會各領域已整合成一個整體表像，而當權者可利用這個整體表像來管制或改變個人的感知方式或價值觀。狄博的這個「表像社會」概念對於追求開放多元的後現代社會有警告與提醒的作用：開放多元不等於解放或自由，反而可能是另一種形式的監控或束縛。從傅柯所談的「生命政治」的角度來看，「生命」（心靈及身體）的解放，其實代表生命的物化或量化，使其成為「政治」（國家權力體制）管制的對象；生命的解放是後現代社會知識權力體系的運作模式，不一定具有革命的效力，這是傅柯的「權力」論述有別於具有烏托邦傾向的「超人類主義」或哈樂威的「人機複合體」（「半人」）之處。但傅柯的「權力」論述，不是一般批評家所談的，是抹煞或忽略主體的，而是其主體或倫理論述的基礎。也就是說，主體依「權力」而生，主體相對於「權力」而言，是全然「內在的」，而非「超越的」。後期傅柯則強調主體自身如何詮釋及管理知識權力體制所呼喚的慾望及身體，使主體內部形成一個與知識權力體制之間的雙向緩衝機制，讓主體不（完全）受慾望或身體所束縛。前期傅柯強調主體與知識權力的摺疊，而後期傅柯則強調主體與知識權力互動過程中所產生的主體與自身的摺疊，形成主體的反身性，傅柯稱之為「主體詮釋學」（the hermeneutics of the self）或「主體的管理」（the care of the self）。後期傅柯強調的反身性可收「以量制量」、「以毒攻毒」之效，讓主體也量化、虛假化，而為後現代主體另闢蹊徑。後期傅柯所著重的「自我管理」基本上就在剖析主體如何在權力內部（也是主體內部）找到自我的內在界限或「摺疊」， 這是一種「內在的界面管理」，是一種「反身性倫理」。傅柯「生命政治」所涉及的倫理學和一般後現代、後結構主義強調以「他者」為主體的倫理學（列維那斯）之間的差異可見一斑。本文前半部剖析傅柯理論樞紐的「管理」概念，說明主體如何進行「內在的界面管理」為主，而後半部則以電影《關鍵報告》為例，闡釋在後現代社會或未來社會裡，主體如何完全受權力（系統）掌控，而主體又該如何與權力（系統）「摺疊」，借力使力，找到其「反身性倫理」。

Postmodern society is a society of deterritorization, in which the boundaries traditionally set up for “humanism” have broken down, in which various kinds of “other” and desires are liberated. The problem is: is the liberation of “other” and desire the right and only way to freedom of the subject? For many theorists, the answer is “no.” For Guy Debord, it is the media which bombard people in postmodern society with the spectacle of liberation such that the society has become a “society of the spectacle” through which the authority can easily manipulate the values of the people with the spectacle. For Foucault, the liberation of life is the target of the regime of bio-politics and has to do with knowledge and power rather than freedom of the subject. The regime of bio-politics, for Foucault, is responsible for the objectification of the subject and turns the subject into a unit of the state policy of population. And yet, the later Foucault spots a reflexivity within the subject, a reflexivity called by him as “the hermeneutics of the self” or “the care of the self,” through which the subject can objectify itself and attain an “objectification of objectification,” thus creating a buffer for the subject within the power relationship. The reflexivity of the subject enables the subject to cope with power and create a “folding” relationship with power. The reflexivity of the subject, “the hermeneutics of the self” or “the care of the self,” for Foucault, constitutes an “ethics of the self,” an ethics based on the relationship between the subject and itself and different from Levinas’ ethics based on the relationship with the other.