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題名:公司代理成本與會計師事務所之委任
書刊名:多國籍企業管理評論
作者:黃劭彥 引用關係張雅芬林琦珍 引用關係田耕銘
作者(外文):Huang, Shaio-yanChang, Yea-fenLin, Chi-chen
出版日期:2009
卷期:3:2
頁次:頁67-77
主題關鍵詞:代理成本會計師事務所家族企業Agency costCPA firmFamily firm
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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  • 共同引用共同引用:25
  • 點閱點閱:28
先前文獻指出,審計品質與會計師事務所規模成正相關,所以當公司需要較高的審計品質,就應該傾向委任大型會計師事務所。由於台灣的上市櫃公司所有權組成特徵,與美日大不相同,其中之一為家族企業情況普遍。本研究欲探討此種特殊的台灣環境下,代理成本在台灣是否也能解釋代理問題與較高之審計品質需求間之關聯。實證結果顯著地支持,當公司是完全的家族企業,董事會是由家族成員佔有絕對多數時,當董事的持股越高,對於高審計品質之需求較低,傾向委任非大型會計師事務所。但是,當公司並不是完全的家族企業,家族成員並未佔有公司董事會之絕對多數之時,情況恰好相反,當董事的持股越高,對高審計品質的需求越高,越傾向委任大型會計師事務所。
The previous literatures suggested that the size of the auditing firm is associated with the audit quality. And the higher agency cost of the company is the higher audit quality needed. The characteristics of the companies in Taiwan are much different from those of the companies in the United States. One of those difference characteristics is the family company. This research starts at this point and wants to find out "Does the agency cost can explain the need of audit quality in the family company environment in Taiwan." The result suggests that as the family members have more than half of the board seats, the more stocks directors holding, the higher possibility the company would engage Non-Big4. As the family members have less than half of the board seats, the more stocks directors holding, the higher possibility the company would engage Big4 in Taiwan.
期刊論文
1.Carcello,J. V.、Hermanson,D. R.、Huss,H. F.(1995)。The relation between audit structure and public responsibility: Audit firms’propensity to qualify bankruptcy-related option。Research on Accounting Ethics,1,21-42。  new window
2.Charles, P.(2001)。Agency costs and audit quality: evidence from France.。European Accounting Review,10,461-499。  new window
3.Geiger(2006)。Audit Firm Size and Going-Concern Reporting Accuracy。Accounting Horizons,20,1-17。  new window
4.Niemi(2004)。Auditor size and audit pricing: evidence from small audit firms。European Accounting Review,13,541-560。  new window
5.Susan(2000)。Auditor resignations: clientele effects and legal liability。Journal of Accounting & Economics,29,173-205。  new window
6.Fortin, S.、Pittman, J. A.(2007)。The Role of Auditor Choice in Debt Pricing in Private Firms。Contemporary Accounting Research,24(3),859-896。  new window
7.DeAngelo, Linda Elizabeth(1981)。Auditor Independence, 'Low balling', and Disclosure Regulation。Journal of Accounting and Economics,3(2),113-127。  new window
8.王元章(20011000)。內部人持股、風險、股利、負債、投資與公司價值。證券市場發展季刊,13(3)=51,29-70。new window  延伸查詢new window
9.Jensen, Michael C.、Meckling, William H.(1976)。Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure。Journal of Financial Economics,3(4),305-360。  new window
 
 
 
 
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