不同招標目的宜設計不同之招標機制，本文以實證分析測試不同招標機制對私立大專院校審計服務品質與審計公費之影響。政府為改善私校之審計成效，於2001至2003學年分別採公開招標、限制性招標及選擇性招標等三種方式選任查核會計師，並由教育部編列經費支付審計費用；會計師選任方式更迭亦造成2001及2003學年度大量更換會計師。招標機制不同將影響私校審計品質，預期在選擇性招標時的審計服務將優於公開招標下之品質，且審計公費與資格審查淘汰率呈正相關。公開招標方式雖有助於降低審計公費，但可能因審計品質低而使資訊使用者遭受更大的損失。經使用2001及2003學年度私立大專院校審計公費相關資料進行實證，結果顯示每萬元經常性收入審計公費與資格審核淘汰率為正相關，且四大會計師事務所查核之審計公費亦高於非四大。其次，採選擇性招標年度由四大會計師事務所查核之學校數顯著多於公開招標年度。從會計師查核報告書分析得知，當繼任會計師為四大時，修正前任會計師查核報告書者顯著較多；且非四大會計師事務所給予學校不當查核意見者多於四大會計師事務所。整體而言，在選擇性招標年度之審計品質優於公開招標年度，與預期一致。

Different tender bidding mechanisms can be established for different purposes. This study examines the effect of different tendering procedures on audit quality by empirical analysis. To enhance the effect of financial audit on private universities and colleges, the MOE started hiring accountants and paid audit fees through open tendering procedures, limited tendering procedures, and selective tendering procedures in academic year 2001, 2002, and 2003, respectively. Such changes of tendering procedures resulted in large amount of auditor changes in 2001 and 2003. The study expects that: (1) audit quality under selective tendering procedures to be better than audit quality under open tendering procedures, and (2) audit fee to be positively correlated to elimination rate of qualification evaluation. Although the audit fee under open tendering procedures is lower than those of the other two procedures, lower audit quality rendered under open tendering procedures will cause users of information to suffer more serious injury. The results, based on a sample of 201 private universities and colleges for the academic years 2001 and 2003, show that: (1) there is a positive association between audit fees per ten thousands NT dollars of school's ordinary revenue and the elimination rate of qualification evaluation, and (2) number of schools audited by Big 4 auditors under selective tendering procedures in academic year 2003 is significantly larger than that under open tendering procedures in academic year 2001. The results of the analysis on related auditor reports in this study indicate that: (1) audit reports modified by successor Big 4 auditors are more than those by non-Big 4 auditors, and (2) inappropriate audit opinions issued by non-Big 4 auditors are more than those by Big 4 auditors. In summary, as expected, the results show that audit quality under selective tendering procedures is better than audit quality under open tendering procedures.