我國證券交易法對於上市、上櫃及公開發行公司之董監事整體持股訂有最低持股成數之規定，其目的在於防止董監事對本公司股票之投機性買賣，以降低投資人風險。然而多年來，此項規定之公平性與妥適性亦備受爭議。由於環顧世界各主要國家皆無類似規定，此項我國特有的法律規範其立法意旨是否合於產業實況，乃成為一項值得探究的議題。本研究實證結果顯示，雖然董監事整體持股成數與投資人風險之關聯性大致傾向負相關，但在不同屬性的產業之間、以及不同發展階段或不同規模的公司之間，此項關聯性並非穩定一致。另一值得注意的發現是，在傳統產業中，法定持股成數不足的情況確與公司變更財務報表或發生危機等事件有顯著正相關；但在科技產業中，則不呈現這樣的關聯。這顯示，產業情境對此關聯性確有不可忽略的影響。本研究據此建議，主管機關宜就不同的產業情境，對董監事整體持股之最低成數進行更精細的修訂，以使法律規定能更臻於公平合理。

According to Taiwanese Security Exchange Law, in a public company, the body of board directors and supervisors as a whole must own at least a specified percentage of its outstanding shares (the minimum shareholding requirements). This unique device, which can only be found in Taiwan, is designed to prevent directors and supervisors involving in speculative transactions so as to protect investors. However, questions of fairness and appropriateness arose since its promulgation. This paper aims to evaluate the suitability of Taiwan’s minimum shareholding requirements. The results show that, though the relationship between the shareholdings of controlling insiders and investor’s risk tend to be negative, it’s not consistent and stable in different industrial context. In traditional industries, there is a positive relationship with statistical significance between the frequency of insufficient shareholding and the possibility of restatement of financial reports and corporate crisis. But this relationship does not exist in technological industries. All these results imply the industrial context has impacts on the relationship in concern. Accordingly, this paper suggests a rigorous review for the minimum shareholding requirements in light of industrial context, to improve its fairness and appropriateness.