| 期刊論文| 1. | Davis, M.、Maschler, M.(1965)。The kernel of a cooperative game。Naval Research Logistics Quarterly，12，223-259。   | | 2. | Hart, S.、Mas-Colell, A.(1989)。Potential, value, and consistency。Econometrica，57(3)，589-614。 | | 3. | Moulin, H.(1985)。The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods。Journal of Economics Theory，36，120-148。 | | 4. | Peleg, B.(1986)。On the reduced game property and its converse。International Journal of Game Theory，15，187-200。 | | 5. | Peleg, B.(1985)。An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments。Journal of Mathematical Economics，14，203-214。 | | 6. | Serrano, R.、Volij, O.(1998)。Axiomatizations of neoclassical concepts for economies。Journal of Mathematical Economics，30，87-108。 | | 7. | Tadenuma, K.(1992)。Reduced games, consistency, and the core。International Journal of Game Theory，20，325-334。 | | 8. | Myerson, R. B.(1980)。Conference structures and fair allocation rules。International Journal of Game Theory，9(3)，169-182。 | | 9. | Maschler, M.、Owen, G.(1989)。The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games。International Journal of Game Theory，18(4)，389-407。 | 圖書論文| 1. | Shapley, L. S.(1953)。A value for n-person game。Contributions to the Theory of Games。Princeton, New Jersey：Princeton University Press。 | |