本研究主要檢視銀行股權結構對市場紀律的影響。我們使用2002 至2012 年間，全球88 個國家共 827 家商業銀行為樣本，其主要的結果如下: 第一，在金融危機後，存款者對於銀行的倒閉及流動性風險更加關注。第二，在2008 年金融危機後，國有股權將減弱市場紀律的力量。第三，不論在金融危機發生前後，外國銀行股權皆使得存款者的市場紀律力量被削弱。第四、提高銀行外部審計制度的有效性或報表透明度，將加強銀行的市場紀律，但較嚴格的銀行跨業限制反而減弱市場紀律的力量。第五、小型銀行或在較不競爭的市場，國內私人股權有利於市場紀律。但大型銀行或較不競爭的銀行市場，國有股權反而減弱市場紀律。最後，銀行股權對市場紀律的影響，將隨著各國不同的銀行監理機制而有所差異。

This paper analyzes the effect of bank ownership structure on market discipline in an international sample of banks. We control for unobservable bank, country, and time specific effects using a panel data set banks from 88 countries during the period 2002-2012. The price of deposits is used to measure market discipline in a dynamic panel data methodology on a sample of 837 commercial banks. We find that on average market discipline weakens with foreign bank, while enhances with stated-own bank after 2008 banking crisis. Second, better external audit and accounting disclosure will improve market discipline, but at the same time it worsens with the by stricter restrictions on bank activities. Third, increased domestic private ownership significantly strengthens the market discipline on small bank, less competition market or ex post funding of deposit insurance. These results have important implications for banking ownership and market discipline, particularly after a crisis period.