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題名:The Determinants of Equity Compensation for Audit Committee Members
書刊名:臺大管理論叢
作者:賴運霆吳淑鈴
作者(外文):Lai, Yun-tingWu, Shu-ling
出版日期:2016
卷期:27:1
頁次:頁363-394
主題關鍵詞:公司治理審計委員會權益薪酬代理問題Corporate governanceAudit committeeEquity-based compensationAgency conflicts
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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由於權益薪酬之使用漸趨廣泛,其相關討論增加,再加上審計委員會職責逐漸加重等因素,促使本研究欲找出哪些因素使得公司給予其審計委員會成員權益薪酬。研究發現代理問題較嚴重之公司傾向不給予權益薪酬。薪酬委員會中成員同時為審計委員會成員之比例則與給予權益薪酬之可能性呈顯著正向關係。而審計委員會中董事同時為其他公司之高階主管之比例越高則公司傾向不給予權益薪酬。本研究期能對審計委員會成員權益薪酬之相關議題做進一步的補充,幫助釐清採用權益薪酬之決定因素。
The controversy around the rising use of equity-based compensation for audit committee members and the enhanced responsibilities of audit committee is the basis for this study to examine the factors that affect a firm’s use of stocks and stock options to remunerate audit committee members. Our results show that firms having more severe agency conflicts are less likely to give equity-based compensation to audit committee members. Furthermore, firms with more compensation committee members sitting on the audit committee are significantly more likely to compensate audit committee members with stocks and stock options. Moreover, when more audit committee members are also top managers of other companies, the probability of equity remuneration for audit committee members is lower. Given that prior studies find that equity-based compensation for audit committee members is associated with earnings management, accounting restatement, and internal control weakness, our study contributes to the literature by identifying the factors that contribute to the use of equity-based compensation for audit committee members.
期刊論文
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