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題名：台灣上市公司控管機制之研究-探討家族與非家族企業高階主管薪酬與離職的控管效果
作者：林穎芬 引用關係
作者(外文)：Lin, Ying-Fen
校院名稱：國立中山大學
系所名稱：企業管理學系
指導教授：劉維琪
林財源
學位類別：博士
出版日期：1999
主題關鍵詞：薪酬；離職；代理理論；管家理論；控制機制；compensation；turnover；agency theory；stewardship theory；control mechanism
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
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  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(9) 博士論文(4) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
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  • 點閱點閱:55
代理理論以人性自利的假設出發，認為在自然狀態下關係雙方的行為者(主理
人及代理人)的標、利益、風險是不一致的，使得代理人未必會依照主理人的利
益行事，因此需要籍助一連串的機制確保代理人的行為會符合主理人的利益，而高
階主管的薪酬設計與替換高階主管即是公司可用以減少代理問題的控制機制。
然而，一個行為者是否在所有的關係或脈絡中都會如同代理理論所描述的方式
行動呢?如果不是,則代理理論提出,確保代理人的行動會符合主理人利益的機制，是
否還會存在?是今人懷疑的。若將台灣家族企業的特質與代理理論所奠基的假設
相對照，可看出代理理論的假設,例如自利、組織成員目標衝突與資訊不對稱等，可
能無法真切描述家族企業的運作情形，因此，是否所有的企業都適用於代理理論的
推論，是本研究希望探討的一項議題。
本研究以非家族企業與家族企業，分別進行高階主管薪酬與離職的研究，在高
階主管薪酬的研究上，探討公司績效、董事會的控制、外部大股東的控制和公司成
長機會等因素對高階主管薪酬之影響;在高階主管離職方面，同樣以非家族企業與
家族企業研究，以績效決定高階主管離職之效率性、在高階主離職事件中外部董事
和外部大股東所扮演的角色、超額薪酬等因素對高階主管離職的影響。
本研究回顧以上主題之相關文獻，發展二十個待驗證假說，在高階主管薪酬的
研究中以1995一1997年上市公司營建業以外之製造業為研究樣本，以LISREL模式驗
證假說;在高階主管離職的研究上以上市公司營建業以外之製造業為研究樣
本，1996一1997年發生高階主管異動事件與否與前一年相關變數之關係，驗證假說的
方法為 Logistic 迴歸模式。
本研究的重要研究結論為:
一、確定代理理論在台灣的適用範疇為非家族企業，而台灣的家族企業不屬於代理
理論的適用範圍，因此，代理理論無法概化至全部的台灣上市公司。
二、代理理論中以績效決定高階主管的薪酬與以績效決定高階主管離職的控制機
制在台灣非家族企業的執行是有效果的。
三、外部董事在非家族企業高階主管薪酬與離職的決定上佔有重要地位
四、評估高階主管的績效，會計基礎重於市場基礎.
Agent theory starts with the assumption that people act in their own self-interest, and holds that under normal conditions, the goals, interests, and risks of two actors (main actor and agent) are not identical. This means that the agent will not necessarily act according to the interests of the main actor. Thus, a series of mechanisms are required to ensure that the agent will behave according to the main actor''s interests. CEO compensation and CEO replacement are types of control mechanisms that companies employ to reduce the agent problem.
Is it possible for an actor to behave exactly as is described in agent theory, regardless of the context or surrounding relationships? If it is not possible, then are the control mechanisms that agent theory proposes to control the behavior of the agent viable? This question is open for debate. Agent theory - that is, the presumption of self-interest, conflict of interests and goals, and asymmetric information - is unable to grasp the practical reality and special characteristics of Taiwan''s family businesses. This paper will thus discuss whether all companies are suitable to be researched using agent theory.
This paper will divide companies into family enterprises and non-family enterprises, and will research into CEO compensation and termination. We will investigate the influence of company performance, board control, external shareholder control and the possibly for company growth on CEO compensation. In terms of CEO termination, this paper will look at the influence of company performance on the effectiveness of CEO termination for family and non-family enterprises, the role of external board members and external shareholders in the termination process, and the influence of excessive compensation on CEO termination.
This paper will review literature pertaining to the above issues, and will develop a twelve point hypothesis. The samples used in the paper for CEO compensation will come from listed manufacturing companies (not including construction companies) between 1995-1997. The samples were verified using the LISREL model. The samples used in the paper for CEO termination research came from manufacturing companies in Taiwan (not including construction companies) listed between 1996-1997, and determined whether there were any changed in the CEO of companies between these years. The samples were verified using a logistic regressive model.
This paper''s conclusion is as follows:
1. We have confirmed that agent theory is suitable for non-family enterprises in Taiwan, and unsuitable for family enterprises. Agent theory has been found insufficient to understand all companies in Taiwan.
2. Within agent theory, the hypothesis that performance determines CEO compensation and the termination mechanism has been found to be true in non-family enterprises in Taiwan.
3. External board members play an important role in CEO compensation and termination in non-family companies in Taiwan.
4. An accounting basis is more important that a market basis for determining CEO performance.
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