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題名：公司成長機會對經理人持股與董事會組成影響之研究
書刊名：中山管理評論
作者：黃旭輝 引用關係／陳隆麒／謝劍平
作者(外文)：Huang, Hsu-huei／Chen, Long-chi／Shieh, Joseph C. P.
出版日期：2001
卷期：9:1
頁次：頁37-59
主題關鍵詞：代理問題；成長機會；經理人持股；外部董事；Agency problem；Growth opportunity；Managers' stock holding；Outside director
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
相關次數：
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(13) 博士論文(5) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:13
  • 共同引用共同引用:72
  • 點閱點閱:33
　　雖然所有權與經營權分離的公司，均無可避免會有代理問題的產生，但成長機會較大的公司，由於經理人行為的可觀察性較小，因而資訊不對稱的程度也較為嚴重，本文研究主旨在於探討高成長的公司是否會因其面臨較大的代理問題，而採取相對應的內部機制以禮制其代理成本，文中探討的內部機制包括提升經理人的持股比率以及聘僱較多的外部董事，本文以85年以前在台灣證券交易所上市的公司為研究對象，研究樣本包含328家公司，經由變異數分析、Scheffe檢定及迴歸分析，本研究的結論支持文中所提的二個假說，亦即高成長 的公可為了降低代理問題，一方面會提升其經理人的持股比率，另一方面也會聘僱更多的外部董事。
　　Agency problem exists in corporations where ownership is separated from management. Led by more severe information asymmetry, the higher growth opportunity companies deepen its agency problem. The main purpose of this paper is to discuss if the higher growth corporations would take some internal control mechanisms, including higher managers' stock holding and more outside directors, to ease this problem. The sample includes 328 companies listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange before 1996. The ANOVA, Scheffe, and regression analysis are used to examine the hypotheses, and the results demonstrate that higher growth corporations have higher managers' stock holding and more outside directors.
期刊論文
1.Williamson, O. E.(1983)。Organization Form, Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control。The Journal of Law and Economics，26(2)，351-366。  new window
2.Park, S.、Song, M. H.(1995)。Employee Stock Ownership Plans, Firm Performance, and Monitoring by Outside Stockholders。Financial Management，24(4)，52-65。  new window
3.Lewellen, Wilbur G.、Loderer, Claudio、Martin, Kenneth(1987)。Executive Compensation and Executive Incentive Problems: An Empirical Analysis。Journal of Accounting and Economics，9(3)，287-310。  new window
4.Lubatkin, M. H.、Albert, A. A.Jr.、Lane, P. J.(1998)。Agency problems as antecedents to unrelated mergers and diversification: Amihud and Lev reconsidered。Strategic Management Journal，19(6)，555-578。  new window
5.Wagner, J. A.、Stimpert, J. L.、Fubara, E. I.(1998)。Board Composition and Organizational Performance: Two Studies of Insider/Outsider Effects。Journal of Management Studies，35(5)，655-677。  new window
6.Linn, Scott C.、Park, Daniel(2005)。Outside director compensation policy and the investment opportunity set。Journal of Corporate Finance，11(4)，680-715。  new window
7.Oviatt, Benjamin M.(1988)。Agency and Transaction Cost Perspectives on the Manger-Shareholder Relationship: Incentives for Congruent Interests。Academy of Management Review，13(2)，214-225。  new window
8.邱毅、張訓華(19910500)。股權結構、董事會組成與企業財務績效。臺北市銀月刊，22(5)=260，11-32。  延伸查詢new window
9.Shome, Dilip K.、Singh, Sudhir(1995)。Firm value and external blockholdings。Financial Management，24(4)，3-14。  new window
10.Morck, Randall、Shleifer, Andrei、Vishny, Robert W.(1988)。Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis。Journal of Financial Economics，20(1/2)，293-315。  new window
11.Miller, Merton H.、Modigliani, Franco(1961)。Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares。The Journal of Business，34(4)，411-433。  new window
12.Kosnik, Rita D.(1987)。Greenmail: A study of board performance in corporate governance。Administrative Science Quarterly，32(2)，163-185。  new window
13.Chung, Kee H.、Charoenwong, Charlie(1991)。Investment Options, Assets in Place, and the Risk of Stocks。Financial Management，20(3)，21-33。  new window
14.Fama, Eugene F.、Jensen, Michael C.(1983)。Separation of ownership and control。The Journal of Law & Economics，26(2)，301-325。  new window
15.Gaver, Jennifer J.、Gaver, Kenneth M.(1993)。Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies。Journal of Accounting and Economics，16(1-3)，125-160。  new window
16.Mehran, Hamid(1995)。Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance。Journal of Financial Economics，38(2)，163-184。  new window
17.Smith, Clifford W. Jr.、Watts, Ross L.(1992)。The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies。Journal of Financial Economics，32(3)，263-292。  new window
18.Finkelstein, Sydney(1992)。Power in top management teams: Dimensions, measurement, and validation。Academy of Management Journal，35(3)，505-538。  new window
19.Lang, Larry、Ofek, Eli、Stulz, Rene M.(1996)。Leverage, investment and firm growth。Journal of Financial Economics，40(1)，3-29。  new window
20.Fama, Eugene F.(1980)。Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm。Journal of Political Economy，88(2)，288-307。  new window
21.Jensen, Michael C.、Ruback, Richard S.(1983)。The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence。Journal of Financial Economics，11(1-4)，5-50。  new window
22.Moore, W. T.、Lippert, R. L.(1995)。Monitoring Versus Bonding: Shareholder Rights and Management Compensation。Financial Management，24(3)，54-62。  new window
23.Pearce, John A. II、Zahra, Shaker A.(1992)。Board composition from a strategic contingency perspective。Journal of Management Studies，29(4)，411-438。  new window
24.Rosenstein, Stuart、Wyatt, Jeffrey G.(1990)。Outside Directors, Board Independence, and Shareholder Wealth。Journal of Financial Economics，26(2)，175-191。  new window
25.Weisbach, Michael S.(1988)。Outside directors and CEO turnover。Journal of Financial Economics，20(1/2)，431-460。  new window
26.Shleifer, Andrei、Vishny, Robert W.(1997)。A survey of corporate governance。The Journal of Finance，52(2)，737-783。  new window
27.周行一、陳錦村、陳坤宏(19960700)。家族企業、聯屬持股與公司價值之研究。中國財務學刊，4(1)，115-139。new window  延伸查詢new window
28.Eisenhardt, Kathleen M.(1989)。Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review。The Academy of Management Review，14(1)，57-74。  new window
29.Amihud, Yakov、Lev, Baruch(1981)。Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers。Bell Journal of Economics，12(2)，605-617。  new window
30.Jensen, Michael C.、Meckling, William H.(1976)。Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure。Journal of Financial Economics，3(4)，305-360。  new window
31.Boudreaux, K. J.(1973)。Managerialism and risk-return performance。Southern Economic Journal，Jan，366-372。  new window
32.Cahan, S. F.、Wilkinson, B. R.(1999)。Board composition and regulatory change: Evidence from the enactment of new companies legislation in New Zealand。Financial Management，Spring，32-42。  new window
33.Finkle, T. A.(1998)。The relationship between boards of directors and initial public offerings in the biotechnology industry。Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice，22(3)，5-29。  new window
34.Larner, R. J.(1966)。Ownership and control in the 200 largest nonfinancial corporations, 1923 and 1963。The American Economic Review，Sep，777-787。  new window
35.Moyer, R. C.、Chatfield, R. E.、Sisneros, P. M.(1989)。Security analysts monitoring activity: Agency costs and information demands。Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis，1989(Dec.)，503-512。  new window
36.Cooley, D. E.、Mosen, R. J.、Chiu, J. S.(1968)。The effect of separation of ownership and control on the performance of the large firm。The Quarterly Journal of Economics，August，435-451。  new window
37.Subrahmanyam, V.、Rangan, N.、Rosenstein, S.(1997)。The role of outsider directors in bank acquisitions。Financial Management，Autumn，23-36。  new window
38.Sorensen, R.(1974)。The separation of ownership and control and firm performance: An empirical analysis。Southern Economic Journal，July，145-149。  new window
學位論文
1.楊蕉霙(1990)。所有權結構與公司價值間關係之研究(碩士論文)。國立中山大學，高雄。  延伸查詢new window
2.吳進登(1996)。競爭優勢、成長機會的價值與現金增資宣告效果關係之研究，0。new window  延伸查詢new window
圖書
1.蔡揚宗(1991)。董監事持股比例與經營績效關係之研究。會計論文集。沒有紀錄。  延伸查詢new window
2.Lewellen, Wilbur G.(1971)。The Ownership Income of Management。The Ownership Income of Management。New York, NY。  new window
3.You, V.、Caves, R.、Smith, M.、Henry, J.(1986)。Mergers and bidders' wealth: Managerial and strategic factors。The Economics of Strategic Planning。沒有紀錄。  new window
 
 
 
 
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