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題名：董監事獨立性、企業結構特徵與盈餘管理之關聯性研究
作者：廖益興
作者(外文)：Liao Yi-Hsing
校院名稱：國立臺北大學
系所名稱：會計學系
指導教授：楊清溪
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2004
主題關鍵詞：公司治理；獨立董監事；異常應計數；盈餘管理；家族控制企業；Corporate governance；Independent directors and independent supervisors；Abnormal accruals；Earnings management；Family-controlled firms
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邇來，受到美國企業相繼爆發財報弊案事件的衝擊，市場投資人普遍萌發嚴重信心危機，紛紛質疑企業財務報表可信度。美國政府為嚴懲企業不法、重拾市場信心，於2002年所頒布企業革新法案中（Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002），已將加強公司治理列為法案重要項目之一。鑒此，我國證期會為對公司治理潮流有所回應，並健全企業經營體質，已於民國91年2月，分別著手修訂上市、上櫃審查準則及相關補充規定，積極推動設置獨立董監事制度。時值公司治理制度的推動在台灣逐漸發酵之際，本研究以異常應計數（Abnormal Accruals）的絕對值作為衡量盈餘管理的代理變數，並分析其與董事會獨立性、董事長兼任總經理、董事會規模、外部機構法人持股及管理當局持股之間的關聯性，藉以探討董事會組成及股權結構，在抑制管理當局盈餘管理行為上的效果。
本研究實證結果發現，董事會的監督機制受到公司是否為家族控制企業的影響很大。如果公司是屬於家族控制企業，董事會明顯欠缺獨立監督功能，且董事會規模若過小，反而愈易助長控制股東操縱盈餘的行為，至於經理人自律效果部分，管理當局持股若超過25％以上，反應的卻是管理者鞏固或掠奪利益論，亦即持股比率愈高，愈會基於私利而影響公司的財務報導，因而整體而言，家族控制企業董事會的各項監督機制除外資法人外，不會有太明顯的公司治理效果。但如果公司是屬於非家族控制企業，則本研究發現，董事會獨立性的監督機制是存在，只是效果不甚明顯，而董事會規模愈大，基本上監督功能愈強，外部機構法人的監督力量轉變為以投信機構法人為主，至於管理者的自律機制，僅管理當局持股比率在5％以下時，管理當局持股愈高才愈具有限制異常應計數絕對值的效果，反應的是利益一致論。整體而論，本文探討的公司治理機制，監督的成效與公司經營權是否掌握在控制家族有關。
至於在額外測試分析部分，外部（或獨立）董監事的專業經歷與經理人盈餘管理的程度並無顯著關聯性。而另以設置有常務董事會的公司樣本進行分析時發現，董事會獨立性確實具有抑制異常應計數絕對值的顯著效果，此一現象或許說明欲衡量外部（或獨立）董監事的公司治理機制，應以實際進入常務董事會執行監督才能發揮應有的功用。
Recently, there were quite a number of accounting scandals and financial fraudulence emerged within American stock markets that led to austere dubiousness about the true financial performance of the company. Unsuitable corporate governance system has been esteemed the root of the matter suffering the serious consequences on financial statement fraud instances. Corrupt morals of firm management provide lessons for Taiwan to stress the pivot of corporate governance. According to the stipulations of Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and Taiwan’s computerized over-the-counter market (OTC) listing rules, every publicly held company should at least bring two independent directors and one independent supervisor into their boards after 2002. This study examines whether accounting choices are driven by opportunistic managers who exploit lax corporate governance system and the impact of family business group on the effectiveness of governing firm management.
This paper finds that board size and managerial ownership yield a nonlinear effect on the absolute value of abnormal accruals. Secondly, corporate governance role of institutional investors indeed vary with their types. Third, the emerging a remarkable effect of corporate governance finally depends on specific board construction. It is distinct that the presence of family-controlled boards will undoubtedly have an adverse effect on governing firm management, which would cause most of corporate governance mechanisms to be useless including the existing independent directors and supervisors system. Hence, further investigation provides evidence that family-controlled firms are associated with weak board monitoring. Additional tests reveal that outside directors or independent directors being planted on the managing boards definitely have greater incentive to intervene earnings manipulation and contribute towards the quality of financial reports. The empirical evidence corresponds to the thought that appropriately structured boards are carrying out their financial reporting duties more effectively.
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