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題名：財政政策與企業研發支出
作者：葉金標
作者(外文)：Yeh, Chin-Piao
校院名稱：國立臺北大學
系所名稱：經濟學系
指導教授：徐偉初
劉崇堅
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2004
主題關鍵詞：投資租稅抵減；研發；平衡預算；經濟成長；租稅政策；investment tax credit；R&D；A Balanced Budget Scheme；economic growth；tax policy
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租稅優惠是政府為促進產業升級、提升R＆D支出意願與經濟成長常用的財政政策。以往討論租稅政策的文獻大都集中在課稅和補貼的效果分析，然而租稅的優惠政策琳瑯滿目，包括投資租稅抵減（investment tax credit）、免稅、加速折舊等型式，不同的租稅優惠政策的有效性是否一致？不同的租稅政策用在相同的廠商或相同租稅政策用在不同的廠商，效果是否有差異？這些問題都值得再深入探討，而就公共政策的層面來說，為研擬有效的政策，政府亦應先了解財政政策對R＆D支出以及對經濟成長的影響，方能提出有效的政策方案。
本文主要以政府財政政策與R＆D支出的三個議題進行研究與討論。第二章為「企業研究發展支出、租稅政策與政府預算限制：一個內生成長模型之應用」。本章延續Barro（1990）內生成長模型，以Cobb-Douglas生產函數除原有的私人資本和政府支出為生產要素外，再加入R＆D為第三種生產要素，藉以探討政府在平衡預算下，財政政策（包括政府支出、投資租稅抵減等）的執行對經濟成長和R＆D的影響。第三章為「租稅政策與R＆D投資：一個Barro＆Sala-i-Martin模型之應用」。本章模型主要依Romer（1987、1990）和Barro＆Sala-i-Martin（1992、1995）設立，分析對最終財廠商或中間廠商課產出稅，然後再給予補貼或投資租稅抵減（ITC），藉以探討對不同廠商給予相同的租稅優惠或同一廠商給予不同的租稅優惠（補貼或投資租稅抵減）所產生的效果有何不同。第四章為「租稅政策與R＆D外溢效果：一個雙占模型之應用」，本章循D’Asprement＆Jacquemin（1988）和Hinloopen（1997）模型設立，假設在雙占模型下廠商所從事R＆D的外溢效果是不對稱，則對生產者補貼和課徵利潤稅的政策組合下，政府如何執行租稅政策以達到社會福利最大。
本文主要研究結論為，一國政府欲以租稅優惠政策來刺激R＆D的增加是可行的，但要增加經濟成長率或社會福利，須審慎考慮獎助的對象（廠商）及方式（補貼或投資租稅抵減），方能使租稅誘因發揮極致。其次，在平衡預算下，若以租稅融通政府支出，羊毛出在羊身上，當政府提供較優惠的租稅政策時，其背後隱含所課徵的租稅亦較高，因而可能出現稅率愈高經濟成長率也愈高的現象。故可知租稅的有效性並非是全面性的，不同的經濟體系所具備的條件不同，所需的租稅優惠政策也不同。因此政府在執行租稅政策時應依不同的產業或廠商的狀況給予不同的租稅優惠獎勵或補貼。此結果亦可解釋為何世界各國大多有優惠的租稅政策，但在某些國家可生成效，而有些國家卻成效不彰。
The research has three majors.
1.R&D Spending, Tax policy and Government Budget Constraint: An Endogenous Growth Model Analysis：
To investigate the relationship between R&D spending by the firm and tax credit provision, the impact of tax credit on private investment, and the effect of tax credit and tax rate on economic growth, an endogenous growth model with an extended AK production function treating R&D expenditure as a factor in production is established in this paper. Result of this model suggests: first, the inclusion of a government budget constraint in the model implies a more generous tax scheme may actually cause a lower economic growth since lower tax collection in turn reduces the level of government spending; secondly, the effect of provision of tax credit on economic growth is exactly opposite to the effect of tax rate, that is, if higher tax rate, other policy instruments unchanged, induce a lower economic growth, then a higher rate of growth can be supported by a higher tax credit; thirdly, the impact of tax credit and tax rate on economic growth, contrary to Harberger’s “Superneutrality conjecture” hypothesis, varies with different tax schemes and production technologies.
2. Tax Policy and R＆D Spending：A Barro＆Sala-i-Martin Model Analysis：
The R&D production model with intermediate inputs developed by Romer and Barro & Sala-i-Martin is applied in this paper to derive the effect of different tax policy mixes on economic growth. Various combinations of government subsidies, including direct subsidy and investment tax credit, and output taxes on final or intermediate product are treated under a balanced government budget condition. The effect of these tax-subsidy mixes are compared with the original market solution and the Pareto optimality state administered by a social planner. Major findings of these comparisons are : (1) Preferential tax provisions for R&D investment will have positive effect on business R&D spending and economic growth. This holds in the case of lowering the tax rate, or increases the tax credit or rate of subsidy. (2) Optimal, or growth maximizing tax rate exists if tax break or direct subsidy is provided for intermediate product firms. No matter which firm, final output or intermediate input, is subject to tax. On the contrary, if subsidy is designed for final product producer, the optimal tax rate will be zero. (3) Direct subsidy will give a higher growth rate than investment tax credit. (4) A better than market solution state exists in a tax-intervened world if the output elasticity of intermediate input values about 1/2. (5) The Pareto optimality state can be achieved by the tax tools only if the output elasticity of intermediate input in the production of final goods happens to be very small.
3. Tax Policy and R&D Spillover：A Duopoly Model Analysis
This chapter studies the effect of tax policies on R&D spending in an asymmetric duopoly market with production spillovers. Balanced government budget tax policy is imposed in the form of combinations of subsidies, including direct subsidy and tax on firms’ profit. Major findings of our theoretical and simulation analysis are: first, a higher spillover rate induces a higher level of R&D spending but causes a lower R&D spending of the rival firm; secondly, preferential tax provisions for R&D investment will have positive effect on total R&D spending and total outputs, provided the high spillover firm having a greater than 0.5 spillover rate.
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