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題名：董事會結構與投票行為：理論與實驗證據
作者：李崑進 引用關係
作者(外文)：Kun-Chin Lee
校院名稱：國立雲林科技大學
系所名稱：管理研究所博士班
指導教授：李春安
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2007
主題關鍵詞：獨立董事；公司治理；獨立董事人力市場；投票行為；Corporate governance；Outside directors；Outside
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
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本文首先建構獨立董事具獨立性與不具獨立性，兩種不同之理論模型，用以分析董事會不同代理人的投票行為。其中獨立董事具獨立性之理論模型，以併購事件為研究議題，模型推導結果顯示，當獨立董事主導的董事會，獨立董事對併購案品質的辨認，如內部董事訊息傳遞論點所預期時，則董事會較能採納有利於組織發展的併購案；相對的，若如預防公司價值折損論點所預期時，則董事會較能否決不利於組織發展的併購案。本文依據此模型推導，另進行董事會投票行為實驗。實驗結果證明，在獨立董事具有實質獨立性前提下，獨立董事比例愈高，董事會效率愈佳。
獨立董事不具獨立性之理論模型，則探討獨立董事人力市場發展水準與董事會決策的關聯性，並使用一般投資計畫案作為研究議題。模型推導結果顯示，若無獨立董事人力市場懲罰效果，獨立董事主導的董事會，將會執行私人利益極大化均衡，使得壞品質投資案被組織採納，此結果會導致公司價值折損且不利組織發展。相對的，當獨立董事人力市場效果開始發生作用後，董事會將漸漸趨向執行對組織發展有利的均衡。本文亦依據此模型推導進行董事會投票行為實驗。實驗結果證明，獨立董事人力市場發展水準愈高，董事會決策效率愈佳，愈能增加公司價值。
另外，實驗結果亦發現，獨立董事若有足夠的任職期間，則能降低董事之間的資訊不對稱，使其更精確判斷投資案的品質。本文推導之理論模型、以及模擬董事會會議與投票行為的實驗分析，可解決董事會投票行為不易進行實證的問題。而本研究的貢獻，除了陳述獨立董事的真值，並且澄清過去相關文獻的不同發現外。最主要的是闡述獨立董事人力市場發展的重要性。
In this paper, we examine the value of outsiders by voting behavior of boards. We first construct a theoretic model to explain the effect of different proportion of outsiders with monitoring incentives to the voting behavior of the boards. Our model proves that boards with a majority of trustworthy but uninformed outsiders can implement institutionally preferred policies and augment corporate performance by upgrading resource allocation. Our laboratory experiments strongly support this conclusion that higher proportion of appointed outsiders yield more efficient boards. Next, under information asymmetry within the directors, the outsider-dominated boards to policy will be anticipated by the aspect of “preventing corporate value discount”. It means that bad policy will be rejected. Furthermore, this paper shows the outsider-dominated boards to policy will be anticipated by the aspect of “insider directors information transmission”, if the outsiders have enough time in their position and less information asymmetry. It means that good policy will be accepted.
Secondly, we also construct the other theoretic model to explain the effect of labor market of outsiders without monitoring incentives to the voting behavior of the boards. We model the voting behavior of boards to demonstrate that the inside directors, whose incentives are not aligned with those of the institution, may propose to bribe outside directors so as to obtain more private benefits, and the key factor of whether outsiders will accept the bribe depend on the effect of labor market for outsiders. We verify that the higher effect of labor market for outsiders, the more effectiveness of the boards. Further, we examine the differences of board vote consistency with strategic equilibrium outcomes across the different degree of outsiders’ labor market effect. We find that board is more likely to execute efficient governance equilibrium and only approve good quality projects when the effect of labor market is high.
We also find outsider-dominated boards, given enough time, will reduce information asymmetry among directors and thereby execute institutionally preferred policies. In addition, theoretically and empirically, the arguments to link between outsiders and effective of boards are mixed in prior studies. However, our theoretic models and laboratory experiments strongly support this conclusion that outside directors can achieve improvement in governance practices by itself, when outsiders’ labor market is well developed.
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