相互參照公司法及企併法之規定，「讓與全部或主要部分之營業或財產」首先引發之問題爲對價種類。企併法尚未頒布前，鮮少探討此一議題。企併法既已明確揭示股份爲對價選項之一，則此種併購型態與合併、分割及概況承受（讓與）間之區別何在，便應釐清，同時，不同對價之選擇下，反對股東是否必須享有股份收買請求權之退場機制亦有檢討之必要。 由於公司組織之基本變動的決定機關爲股東會，因此實務上出現一些令人困惑的現象。當股東會之決議未遵守特別決議之要求時，多數見解認爲此僅爲決議方法違法；是以，決議並非無效，而是得撤銷。另一方面，爲貫徹公司法第一百八十五條爲強行規定之解釋，則認爲未依該條所定程序，將使法律行爲無效，或對公司不生效力（可因公司事後承認而溯及締約時生效）。此種矛盾必須解決，相同的，傳統上對於效力之分類亦有待檢討。 「讓與全部或主要部分之營業或財產」亦涉及公司內部權限劃分之議題。我國公司法是否要建立專屬某一機關權限之概念，應於未來立法中儘速決定。長期以來，有關股東會議程之設定其實十分鬆散。臨時動議除不可碰觸特定事項外，似乎皆可提出討論並做成決議，此無疑爲股東資訊權保障之一大灼傷，與外國立法例亦有顯著不同。公司法於民國九十四年修正，引進股東提案權，而這正提供一個絕佳機會檢視上述之諸多問題。

In Taiwan, the sale of all or a substantial part of a firm's assets or the business itself is regulated by both the Company Law and the Business Merger and Acquisition Law. When these two laws are cross referenced, an important issue surfaces, namely, the issue of consideration, which has long been ignored. The Company Law does not appear to address the issue of the consideration involved in the sale of assets or a business, while the Business Merger and Acquisition Law emphasizes the role played by stock as one of the possible considerations in the acquisition of such assets or a business. If this is the case, then, the differences perceived to exist among the sale of all or a substantial part of the assets/business, a merger and a division, as well as the general assumptions regarding the rights and obligations of the different parties involved should be clearly drawn up. Besides, the remedies offered to dissenting shareholders, commonly known as appraisal rights, should be revisited simultaneously. The difficulties faced by the courts also include, among other things, the validity of the resolution passed by the general meeting as regards the sale of the assets or the business, for instance in the case where the conditions for the requisite quorum or the method of resolution are not met. This problem also reveals the importance of the theory of parity, i.e. the demarcation of powers between the general meeting and the board of directors. Should we decide to have a clear line drawn between the general meeting and the board of directors for the exclusive competence that each is entitled to, both the policy and the ambit of the competence need to be thoroughly examined. At the present time, these issues are not attracting the attention of the legislature. The agenda of the general meeting is often loose, and shareholders are to a certain extent deprived of the right to information. When combined with the topic of the sale of the assets or the business, the theory of parity and the interests of shareholders should be taken into account on the same occasion.