“First, war; second, talk; and third, reassurance” was the tripartite military tactics taken by the Kwantung Army. The Kwantung Army took “war” to the Nationalist's Northeast Garrison Force of Liaoning, since its first and foremost goal was to seize the Southern Manchurian Railway. In addition to gaining control over transportation lines and thereby assure the free movement of the armies, the 25 cities along the Southern Manchurian Railway also provided the best target for takeover in Manchuria, since control of the railway lines meant control of the core. The Kwantung Army tackled Jilin Province with “talk”. Xiqia, the representative chairman of Jilin, opened up the door to the Kwantung Army on the third day following the Mukden incident, and leading the whole provincial surrender soon came on the tenth day. Xiqia's attitude from war to peace was the entire elaborate plan during the incident. With a chessman Xi-qia, 7 infantry brigades, 1 cavalry brigade, 85 percent of the Nationalist infantry and 100 percent of the cavalry troops, abandoned resistance and willing to accept the adjustment. Hence, it is clear that the Kwantung Army's political strategy was a great success. For Heilongjiang, the Kwantung Army offered reassurance, since this area, commonly called northern Manchuria, remained under the influence of USSR. Japan had no power on this area. However, it used the commissioner Zhang Jinghui, a respected man who had power to influence political and military affairs in Manchuria, to build up its power. As opposed to the Kwantung Army's strategy “First, war; second, talk; and third, reassurance,” the Nationalist's Northeast Garrison responded with “refuse battle, fear battle, and observe battle”. The response of the military operations with positive or passive decided who would win or lose. The Kwantung Army took positive actions according to the local conditions, while the Nationalist Northeastern Garrison remained the same old rut and waited to death. Aside from the two sides' different military strategies, the Kwantung Army's capacity for political mobilization cannot be ignored. Jilin recovered within a week and Mukden within two and a half months. The Kwantung Army's ability to lead the recovery is explained by its intimate knowledge of Manchurian conditions. Given the Kwantung's Army's mastery of Manchurian conditions, the Mukden incident progressed according to its plans.