本文的目的在嘗試提供一個關於中國歷史上制度演變的動態模型，期能有助於傳統制度演變之特質的理解。在文中，「制度框架」被規定為一個政治結構下的主要遊戲規則。作者認為傳統的制度框架應包含三個主要構造原素，此即「集權政治」、「精英（貴族／官僚）管理權」，以及「市場式經營」； 模型即由此三者構成。基本上，三個制度原素彼此間存在著不同的組合型態，這些不同組合型態各自蘊涵一種獨特的制度性格，而可以在包含「國家」與「市場」兩個極端的系譜中清楚地顯現出來。除此之外，財產權的消長也已隱含在模型的每一個時點之中。 進一步論，這三個原素的排列組合，為彼此之間的既相容又互斥的特性所決定。一個有趣的現象是，它們之間的衝突消長，恆呈「合二去一」的關係。意即，其中只有兩個的結合，在模型上最為穩定。這是說，三者之中只有任兩者的結合，才可以達到制度上的「均衡」。制度的均衡，表現為一規範該一時代之政經特質且其內在呈現相對穩定的一種制度框架，以此對參與者的行為發揮塑造作用。由此可知，傳統的制度歷史所呈現的，正是從此一均衡到彼一均衡的動態過程。 假定其他條件不變，那麼王權、貴族／官僚以及市場經營三者之不同組合形態，可以形成不同的宏觀制度模式--亦即達到某種均衡--，從而產生極為懸殊的政治、經濟效應。不論歷史如何發展，傳統中所構造而成的制度模式，在性質上都不出於三個原素的隨機排列組合的範圍之外。透過此一模型，傳統制度演變的某些重要特性，或許便得以呈現。作者認為，此一模型應有助於制度變遷的理解，在歷史解釋理論上或有若干價值。

In this paper, the author constructs a dynamic model, as an analytic basis, about development of traditional institutions in Chinese history. The model, which contains three understanding concepts of “centralization of despotism,” “economic powers of aristocracy/bureaucracy” and “market management,” was brought up in the studies in China’s institutional history. Summarily, in history, any, and only two of the three constructional elements could make up an institutional combination simultaneously, and from this to that combination they could produce some very different political and economic effects. The difference was visible especially if that they were put under the polar spectrum of state/market. In addition, property rights of the individual are considered the most important ingredient of institutions in this framework. Therefore, we could clearly discriminate the variation of characteristics in the traditional Chinese institutions from the ebbs and flows of property rights in this spectrum. This model constantly appears a character of “combine-two-leave-one” in institutional evolution because of their simultaneous repellence and accommodation from each other. That is, the two from three elements only could achieve “equilibrium” in the course of institutional development. The history of institutions in traditional China accomplished was a very process that this equilibrium went to that equilibrium in alterations unceasingly. Basing on this model, we could deduce lots of worthy analytical theses on institutional history.