證期局試圖經由公司治理構面降低企業投資人與管理當局間的代理問題，規範董監持股的最低成數，故本研究採風險觀點，檢視董監持股率、盈餘平穩化與企業風險間的關係。盈餘平穩化可掩飾高層剽竊資產的事實，或影響外界的風險評價，進而降低資金成本。結果顯示董監持股愈高，愈傾向透過應計項目平穩營業利益，該平穩化行為亦可減緩企業風險，這意味著投資人僅基於若干會計盈餘指標進行決策，存在功能性的固著。研究結果亦顯示營業外損益減緩投資人認知風險的效果遠不如應計項目，故管理當局近來多不經由營業外損益平穩淨利。即使控制盈餘管理因素，董監持股仍與企業風險呈顯著負相關，這表示董監持股率確為反應企業風險本質的有效訊號。

The Financial Supervisory Commission in Taiwan tries to reduce the agency problem between management and investors through the corporate governance by regulating the low limit of the stock ownership by directors and supervisors. From the angle of risk, the study tests the association between the stock ownership by directors and supervisors, earnings smoothing, and enterprise risk. Earnings smoothing may cover up the fact that the management does piracy, or reduce the cost of capital by influencing the risk evaluation. The results show that the firms with the more stock ownership by directors and supervisors tend to smooth the operating income through accrual items. Such smoothing which decreases the enterprise risk implies the function fixation, signifying that investors make decisions only by considering several indexes in accounting earnings. Research results also show that the effects of risk decrease recognized by investors by manipulating other gain or loss are less significant than the ones of accrual items. As a result, the management has not favored earnings smoothing by manipulating other gain or loss recently. Even controlling the effects of earnings management, the negative association exists between stock ownership by directors and supervisors and enterprise risk, which implies that the stock ownership by directors and supervisors is the valid signal for actual enterprise risk.