傳統見解認為司法違憲審查因宣告國會多數通過的法律無效，而面臨抗多數困境。但這種說法除了沒考慮到國會是否真的代表多數民意外，也並未考量所謂的多數民意是何時、在哪裡形成。這種過度簡化的說法預設了一旦法律通過，民意就不會改變，也預設了全世界的司法違憲審查都以相同的形式在運作。本文嘗試從三個角度指出臺灣的憲法法院實際上是符合多數民意的：判決記錄、議程決定、與個案分析。本文主張憲法法院由於面臨制度上的危機，在多數時候並未選擇對抗當代的多數民意。因此，雖然司法最高性確實存在於臺灣，但僅因為它與多數民意相符。相對地，在許多其他國家被讚揚的司法自制美德，事實上在臺灣是抗多數的。這個特點也影響了憲法法院在將來是否能帶動政治與社會變遷的可能性。

Conventional wisdom has it that judicial review is counter-majoritarian in the sense that it nullifies laws passed by the majority. Yet despite the principal-agent issue of whether legislators faithfully fulfill their obligations, this is still a simplistic depiction and does not take into account when and where the majority is formed. It simply assumes that public opinion does not change once the laws are passed, and judicial review around the globe functions in the same way. This article tries to demonstrate that the Constitutional Court in Taiwan is indeed a majoritarian court from three perspectives: docket records, agenda-setting, and case studies. This article argues that, owing to its institutional crisis, the Court sides with the majority most of the time in the sense that it rarely resists the contemporary congressional majority. Consequently, judicial supremacy does exist in Taiwan, but simply because it is in accordance with the majority. By contrast, judicial self-restraint, championed in many other countries as a virtue, is indeed counter-majoritarian. This characteristic directly affects the likelihood of whether the Court can bring about political and social change in the future.