The main purpose of this essay is to critique the role of the Judicial Yuan as determined at the National Conference on Judicial Reform in July, 1999. The role of the Judicial Yuan was raised at the Conference in order to revise the jurisdiction of judicial administrative litigation. We believe, however, that the trend inherent in this revision will have a detrimental revolutionary impact. Specifically, the Council of Grand Justices will be overhauled and the Judicial Yuan will emerge as the nation’s highest judicial organ in charge of trying cases and interpreting the constitution. Based on the principle of proportionality, we argue that there is good reason to preserve the existing structure of constitutional interpretation, including the power of the Council of Grand Justices. In this paper, our analysis of the impending impact on the Council of Grand Justices proceeds as follows: First, we exam the important conditions of the Council of Grand Justices in order to manifest the origin of the present system. Next, we review the issues and process concerning the National Conference on Judicial Reform’s conclusion and demonstrate that the proposed revision is based on very incomplete and insufficient evidence.