本研究從研發及專利權的角度探討創新績效，並討論高科技產業是否能夠透過公司治理機制提升研發及創新效率，不同的董事會特性，是否會影響投資人對於創新活動的反應。本研究採用2000－2012年之年資料，樣本為上市櫃資訊電子業。實證結果顯示，董監事在監督創新活動上，可能根據自身利益為判斷基準，在創新活動前期，公司投入成本高，董事會的利益有限，因此未能積極執行監督，在創新活動後期，已取得實質專利權，創新活動已見成效，此時董事會才願意發揮監督功能，但實證結果未達顯著水準。獨立董事對於將研發投入及專利權轉換為公司的營業收入沒有幫助，可能是因為獨立董事無法介入公司經營，對於創新活動投入到提升實質經營績效無法干涉，因此實證結果不如預期，為負向不顯著關係，不過在研發投入轉換為專利權的階段，獨立董事可以發揮監督作用，督促公司進行創新，但不顯著。市場評價方面，市場對於董事會功能是否有效提升創新績效持保留態度，認為公司取得實質專利權後，公司較有成長性，因此造成創新績效之市場評價，在董事會介入後結論不一的情況，但不顯著。相較之下，獨立董事的介入，對於創新活動的市場評價有一致性，且達顯著水準，表示市場對於獨立董事的監督功能較為信任。

This study explored innovation performance of R&D and patents, to investigate how the high-tech industries improved efficiency of R&D and innovation through corporate governance. Whether the investor reaction to innovation will vary with different Board members. This study collected data from the technology industry with companies listed between 2000-2012. Empirical results showed that directors and supervisors on the basis of their own interests, they control innovation activities. The Boards didn't supervise activity in the early innovation process because of high cost and limited interest from the Board. The Board was willing to supervise in the late stages of innovation because of substantive patents. However, empirical results did not reach a significant level. Independent Directors did not help R&D and patents produce any operating income. This is likely that independent directors were not involved in company management. So they couldn't manage how the innovation investment enhanced substantive business performance. Therefore, the empirical results didn't meet expectations. However, independent directors can urge the company to innovate in the stage that R&D converted patents. Empirical results did not reach a significant level. About market evaluation, investors couldn't know whether the Board effectively improved innovation performance. After that, the company achieved substantial patent, compared with growth of the company. So the Board Intervention had market evaluation inconsistent. Empirical results did not reach a significant level. In contrast, the market evaluation was consistent with the involvement of independent directors. Empirical results reached a significant level. Investors thought supervisory functions of independent directors was more reliable.