冷戰結束以後，俄國與從其分裂出來的14 個新興獨立國家 之間的關係一直都是國際關係理論的一個絕佳實驗場。過去的研 究發現，在這14 個國家獨立之初，與西方關係愈接近、經濟能 力愈好的國家，比較會對俄國採取抗衡的態度；反之，則比較會 對俄國採取扈從的態度。然而，獨立之後至今已逾20 年，這14 國與俄國關係的發展如何？這兩個因素是否仍然是主導各國選 擇抗衡或扈從俄國的主要因素呢？為了回答這兩個問題，本文發 展出一個「抗衡或扈從」的測量，並據此發現，在冷戰結束之後， 這14 國與西方國家之間的關係對於選擇抗衡或是扈從俄國的重 要性逐漸減低，而它們自己本身的經濟能力依然是決定其外交政 策的重要因素。本文認為，根據文獻的建議，國家經濟能力對於 其外交政策選擇的重要性在於：第一，經濟能力愈好的國家，代 表著該國的國家機器愈有解決各種國內問題的行政能力，也代表 該國愈有足夠的資源可供動用來對抗潛在的對手，也就是愈具有 抗衡的「能力」；第二，經濟能力愈好的國家，也因其有能力自 主發展，其國內政治行為者對於是否堅持抗衡愈有著較高度的共 識，也就是愈具有抗衡的「意願」。本文的論點得到了經驗證據 的支持，對於兩岸關係的發展經驗與未來走向也具有深刻的理論 意涵。

Since the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991, the interaction between Russia and the fourteen former USSR Eurasian states has been an ideal experiment field for international relations theories. Previous research has demonstrated that, among the fourteen newly independent states (NISs), those who are politically closer to the Western world and more developed tend to balance against Russia; and, those who are less close to the Western world and those who are less developed tend to bandwagon with it. However, it has been twenty years since the NISs became independent from Russia. Whether the NISs have changed their foreign policy attitudes toward Russia and whether the two factors of proximity to the West and development are still influential in affecting their Russia policy is in need of further investigation. In order to answer this question, this article develops a new measurement of “balancing or bandwagoning,” which simultaneously concerns “the degree of interest dissimilarity” and “the degree of conflict” between Russia and the fourteen NISs. By applying this new measurement, I find that the NISs’ relationship with the Western world has become less important in the making of their Russia policy, while their ability to maintain their economic development remains the most prominent factor that determines their balance/bandwagon foreign policy choice toward Russia. This is because, as prior research has suggested, their ability to maintain their economic development has two important effects that determine their foreign policy choices. First, it means that the NISs have enough state capacity to solve their domestic problems and that they may have a sufficient surplus of resources to support their decision to balance – that is, they have more “capability” to balancing. Second, because they were able to develop by themselves, their domestic political elites are more likely to reach a consensus on their decision to balance – that is, they have more “willingness” to keep balancing. Otherwise, the elites are more inclined to divide into hawks and doves, which could lead to a debate in the domestic political arena over whether their country should continue to balance against Russia. Empirical evidence of all the fourteen NISs from 1992 to 2009 supports the argument that states increase their balancing behavior against Russia with the increase of their economic capacity. The finding of this research has important policy implications with regards to the evolution of Taiwan’s China policy as well as the future of the Cross-Strait relationship.