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題名:弱排名激勵的社會學分析--以環保部門為例
書刊名:中國社會科學
作者:練宏
作者(外文):Lian, Hong
出版日期:2016
卷期:2016(1)
頁次:82-99+205
主題關鍵詞:強激勵弱排名激勵績效考核政府行為
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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通過近距離觀察某市環保局連續3年的年終考核過程,分析弱排名激勵形成和長期存在的原因。完成任務邏輯、激勵邏輯和政治聯盟邏輯之間序貫作用的政治過程,是弱排名激勵的形成過程。弱排名激勵之所以長期存在且具有效力,是因為相比強激勵,它形式上滿足外在科層要求,而實質上可在內部作出調整,保證靈活的權威支配,兼具適應性和自主性。另外,弱排名激勵還有助于促進同級合作而非過度競爭、塑造上下級的鬆散關聯而非緊密關聯、避免外在激勵過度排擠內在激勵。
We have made a close observation of the course of year-end assessment by an environmental protection bureau in three consecutive years in a certain city, emphatically analyzing the cause both of formation and long-term existence of weak ranking incentives. The political course to complete the sequential application between task logic, incentive logic and political coalition logic is the process of formation of weak ranking incentives. Moreover, weak ranking incentives have existed and been effective for long just because in comparison with strong incentives, it can satisfy external bureaucratic requirements in form, while can be adjusted inside in essence, ensuring flexible authoritative dominance and meanwhile showing adaptability and autonomy. Besides, weak ranking incentives are also helpful in facilitating cooperation at the same level rather than excessive competition, shaping loose connection between higher and lower levels rather than close relationship, and avoiding external incentives from excessively supplanting internal ones.
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