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題名：董事會結構特性與公司績效關係之研究－探討台灣家族控制企業因素的影響
作者：廖秀梅
作者(外文)：Hsiu- Mei Liao
校院名稱：國立臺北大學
系所名稱：會計學系
指導教授：李建然
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2004
主題關鍵詞：公司治理；獨立董監事；董事會結構特性；公司績效；家族控制；corporate governance；independent directors / supervisors；board structure；firm performance；family control
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公司治理制度的主要目的在於建立適當內部與外部機制，以保障公司資金提供者（股東、債權人及各種利害關係人）應有權益，進而提昇公司經營能力，創造公司價值。由於董事會是公司治理的內部核心，本研究旨在探討台灣上市公司董事會結構特性與公司績效之間關係，並考量台灣特殊家族控制型態，是否會影響兩者之關係，藉以了解董事會結構之良窳是否攸關公司的經營價值。
本研究透過年報揭露之董監事資訊，援引上市審查準則第九條、補充規定第十七條所規定獨立性標準，建立完整且詳細之董監事資訊，更精確地判斷董監事組成結構，俾提昇實證結果之效度。實證結果發現，整體而言，董事會結構特性與公司績效的關係的確受到該公司的董事會是否掌控在家族所影響。如果公司是屬於家族控制企業，由於控制股東已實際掌握公司控制權，使得股權機制及外部（或獨立）董監事之設置能發揮的功能有限，而且當董事長兼任總經理，由於同時扮演決策執行者及決策監督者的角色，董事會較易喪失其客觀性及監督的力量，對公司的會計績效產生負面影響。此外，家族控制企業較少聘任專業經理人參與公司經營，故當董監事平均教育程度愈高時，學歷高或具有專業知識董監事會將其專業運用於公司的經營決策上，進而使公司績效提升。
至於在非家族控制企業，發現全部董監事持股比率與公司績效呈現的正向關係，主要是由內部董監事持股所造成的，意謂著當內部董監事持股比率愈高時（但不要超過25%），與外部投資人間之利益愈趨於一致，代理成本愈小，公司的績效愈佳，符合利益收斂假說。另外，外部董監事席次比率應超過20%（但不超過50%），才能在董事會發揮影響力，此時公司績效會隨著外部或獨立董監事席次比率增加而上升。因此，外部或獨立董監事的設立，的確能提升公司績效，尤其是非常需要具有管理經驗或法律背景專業知識之外部（或獨立）董監事監督董事會之運作。
The primary objective of corporate governance is to protect the interests of capital providers (shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders), and furthermore, improve the company’s management ability and create its values through the establishment of proper internal and external mechanisms. A company’s board of directors is at the core of corporate governance. This study aims to examine the link between the board structure of listed companies in Taiwan and corporate performance, and look into whether family control or the special ownership pattern among many listed companies in Taiwan would influence such relationship so as to understand whether the soundness of board structure plays a role in corporate value.
In conjunction with the implementation of the independent director and supervisor system, with complete and detailed information on corporate directors and supervisors disclosed in the annual report, this study was able to determine more accurately the board composition by criteria for independence, examine in depth the link between the board structure and corporate performance, and thereby, render the empirical results more relevant. The findings that the relationships between the board structure and firm performance are overall influenced by whether the board is family-controlled. In family-controlled firms, the controlling shareholders hold the actual controlling power, which limits the functions of the ownership mechanism and outside (or independent) directors. In particular when the chairman of the firm is also its president, it is more likely for the board to compromise its objectivity and the monitoring power, hence harming firm performance. Also, few family-controlled firms hire professional management to run the company. Thus if the board members of a family-controlled firm are highly educated, they could apply their knowledge or professional experience to help the management in decision making, and thereby, improve firm performance. In the case of non-family-controlled firms, it is found the shareholding of directors, in particular the shareholding of inside directors, had positive effect on firm performance. In other words,when the percentage shareholding of inside directors is higher（no more than 25%）, their interests are more in line with those of the outside investors and the agency cost becomes smaller, hence improving the firm’s performance. This finding is consistent with the convergence of interest hypothesis. In addition, the appointment of outside or independent directors helped improve firm performance（higher than 20%, but no more than 50%）, in particular if such director has management experience or legal background or expertise.
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