公司治理、產業競爭程度、相對績效與高階管理者離職關係之實證研究_

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題名：	公司治理、產業競爭程度、相對績效與高階管理者離職關係之實證研究
作者：	歐陽豪
作者(外文)：	Hou Ou-Yang
校院名稱：	國立成功大學
系所名稱：	企業管理學系碩博士班
指導教授：	莊雙喜
學位類別：	博士
出版日期：	2007
主題關鍵詞：	景氣循環指標；相對績效；高階管理者更迭；公司治理機制；Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE)；Top Managers Turnover；Corporate Governance Mechanism；Business Cycle Index
原始連結：	連回原系統網址
相關次數：	歷年統計：被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0) 排除自我引用:0 共同引用:0 點閱:114

本文以高階管理者更迭為主要研究事件，探討台灣上市公司績效與相對績效評估指標對高階管理者更迭機率的影響，此外亦討論高階管理者持股比率與高階管理者為家族集團成員對內部治理效力之影響，並進一步驗証外部治理機制對不利於內部治理效率之影響。經過迴歸實証發現，其它條件不變下，會計績效指標－前期每股盈餘與高階管理者更迭的機率呈現顯著的負相關；高階管理者的持股比率對董事長及總經理的更迭率均為不顯著的負向影響，高階管理者為家族集團成員顯著的減少高階管理者更迭的機率，最後，董事長兼任總經理對董事長之更迭機率為顯著正向影響，對總經理的更迭呈現不顯著的負向影響；外部治理變數中：僅機構法人持股率的係數顯著為正，表示機構法人持股率愈高會增加高階管理者更迭之可能性。三項外部治理機制變數中，僅機構法人持股率對高階管理者有監督的力量。
在董事長更迭迴歸中，在高競爭產業及景氣持平與繁榮階段，相對會計績效－董事長更迭的負向敏感性較高，在總經理更迭迴歸中，在低競爭產業及景氣衰退階段，相對會計績效－總經理更迭的負向敏感性較高；董事長持股率的係數在景氣衰退階段顯著為負，而總經理持股率的係數在高競爭產業顯著為負；在低競爭產業與景氣衰退階段，機構法人持股比率－高階管理者更迭間的正向敏感性較高；在高競爭產業及景氣衰退階段，董事長為家族集團成員－董事長更迭的負向敏感性較高，而在高競爭產業及景氣持平與繁榮階段，總經理為家族集團成員－總經理更迭的負向敏感性較高；在高競爭產業，董事長兼任總經理－總經理更迭間有顯著的負相關。
從績效與高階管理者持股比率之交互項，不論董事長或總經理持股為連續變數或虛擬變數，可發現高階管理者的持股率越高，前期調整後股票到酬與每股盈餘與高階管理者的更迭率之顯著負相關已不存在，此時，高階管理者更迭機率－績效間的關係較不敏感，換言之，當董事長或總經理持股5%以上即會削弱績效與高階管理者更迭率間之負相關，亦即高階管理者持股比率高時，產生的固守職位效果，使得公司撤換此一不良績效的總經理，更形困難。而高階管理者為家族集團成員身分亦會降低會計績效－高階管理者更迭率間的負向敏感性。
外部治理機制變數是否可降低高階管理者持股率對其本身更迭機率之影響分析。本研究發現三項外部治理變數中，僅機構法人持股比率有降低高階管理者持股比率對內部治理機制不利影響的效果(績效－高階管理者更迭率間負向敏感性)。外部治理機制變數是否可降低高階管理者為控制家族集團成員對其本身更迭機率之影響分析。本研究發現：三項外部治理變數均有降低高階管理者為控制家族集團成員對內部治理機制不利影響的效果。

以文找文

This dissertation focuses on the issue of top manager turnover and discusses the effectiveness of corporate performance and a relative performance evaluation index in relation to the probability of top manager turnover for Taiwanese stock-listed firms. In addition, this dissertation discusses the affect of top managers’ shareholdings and those managers that belong to controlling family members on internal governance effectiveness. Furthermore, this dissertation tests the impact of an external governance mechanism on the effectiveness of internal governance. The empirical logistic regression findings indicate that, all other elements being equal, in the relationship between turnover rate of top managers, earnings per share is significantly negative; in the relationship between turnover rate of top manager to top managers’ shareholdings is negative, but does not reach the significant level. Top managers－chairman and CEO who belong to controlled family members will significantly reduce the probability of top manager turnover. Finally, firms in which the chairman of the board of directors is also the CEO have a significantly positive affect on the probability of chairman turnover, while it has negative effect on the probability of CEO. The variables among external governance are that only the coefficient of institutional shareholdings is significantly positive with the manager turnover, which implies that the greater the institutional shareholdings, the greater the possibility of top manager turnover. Institutional shareholding is the only variable among three external governance mechanisms that has monitoring power over top managers.
In the chairman of the board of directors’ turnover regression, the negative sensitivity between relative EPS and chairman turnover is greater in highly competitive industries, normal stage and prosperity stage in the business cycle. In the CEO turnover regression, the negative sensitivity between relative EPS to CEO turnover is greater in less competitive industries and in which the firm is in the recession stage of the business cycle. The coefficient of chairman shareholdings is significantly negative in the recession stage, while the coefficient of CEO shareholdings is significantly negative in highly competitive industries. The positive sensitivity between relative to institutional shareholdings The coefficient of chairman shareholdings is significantly negative in recession stage, while the coefficient of CEO shareholdings is significantly negative in high competitive industry. And top manager turnover is greater in less competitive industries and for those that are in the recession stage of the business cycle. The negative sensitivity that exists between chairmen who belong to controlled family members to chairman turnover is greater in highly competitive industries and in firms that are in the recession stage of the business cycle, while the negative sensitivity between the relative CEO condition that belongs to controlled family members to CEO turnover is greater in highly competitive industries and those firms that are normal or in the prosperity stage of the business cycle. Finally, there exists a significantly negative relationship between the situations in which the chairman is also the CEO to CEO turnover.
With regard to the interaction item between performance and top manager shareholdings, neither continuous variables nor dummy variables of chairman shareholdings or CEO shareholdings, cause the empirical results to find that the more top manager shareholdings, the greater the negative relationship between stock return or EPS to top managers turnover does not exist, and the sensitivity between performance to top manager turnover is reduced. In other words, the negative relationship between performance to top manager turnover is reduced when chairman or CEO shareholdings exceed 5%. Namely, there exists an entrenchment effect when top manager shareholdings rise, which makes the firm’s ability to displace bad performing CEOs more difficult. In addition, top managers that belong to controlled family members also reduce the negative sensitivity that exists between accounting performance to top manager turnover.
In the analysis of whether an external governance mechanism can reduce the negative relationship of top manager shareholdings to top managers turnover, this research finds that only institutional shareholding has the affect of reducing bad affects on the top manager shareholding to internal governance mechanism (namely, the negative sensitivity that exists between performance to top manager turnover). In the analysis of whether external governance mechanisms can reduce the negative relationship of top managers who belong to controlled family members to top manager turnover, this research finds that all three external governance variables have the affect of reduction for the top managers who belong to controlled family members to internal governance mechanism (namely, the negative sensitivity that exists between top managers who belong to controlled family members to top managers turnover).

以文找文

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1.	經理人過度自信與產業專精會計師之選擇
2.	公司發言人異動對股價影響之研究
3.	The Firm Risk for a Family Firm and the Role of Growth Opportunity and Control-Cash Flow Right Deviation: The Viewpoint of the Risk Effect of the Convergence of Interest Hypothesis
4.	薪酬委員會品質是否影響核心代理問題與薪酬績效敏感性間的關聯？
5.	企業社會責任與租稅規避之關係：產品市場競爭的角色
6.	Inside Directors' Characteristics and Accruals Management: The Roles of Controlling Shareholders' Control-cash Flow Rights Deviation, Accounting Background, and Family Member
7.	職能區分對盈餘資訊性之影響--以財會主管異動公司為例
8.	內部董事比例、獨立董事比例與資訊揭露品質之關聯--家族持股之影響
9.	Family Ownership and Firm Performance in Taiwanese Firms
10.	若即若離？探索TSSCI商管社群網絡結構及知識活動--編輯群重疊的策略觀點
11.	CEO Reputation and Audit Fees
12.	Different Pay-performance Sensitivity in Family Firms: A Perspective of the Family Incentive Alignment Hypothesis
13.	實質盈餘管理、公司治理、高階經理人報酬
14.	不同生命週期下核心代理問題對高階經理團隊薪酬之影響
15.	產業環境對董事會特質與政治關係之影響

1.	企業社會責任、環境績效與環境會計資訊揭露能有益於企業價值？以公司治理觀點而論
2.	國民小學行政主管人格特質、組織承諾對學校特色課程影響之個案研究
3.	總經理減薪效應、盈餘管理與家族控制型企業之研究
4.	公司治理之資訊揭露程度對公司績效之影響效果:利用台灣證交所資訊揭露評鑑系統之實證
5.	資訊揭露對盈餘管理與公司績效之影響
6.	組織結構、薪酬差異與經營績效：以會計師產業為例
7.	組織公平與印象管理對薪酬制度與角色外行為的干擾效果研究
8.	核心代理問題與董監自利行為、研發效率之關聯性
9.	經理人薪酬契約對盈餘管理行為之影響—以生命週期觀點
10.	政府與國立大學財務關係之研究：以主理代理理論觀點為例
11.	從核心代理問題的角度探討股權結構，董事會特性對公司價值及盈餘管理之影響
12.	獨立董事機制與企業經營成敗關係之研究
13.	管理階層異動資訊對股價報酬之影響
14.	獨特性風險、報酬偏態與公司治理
15.	董事會之獨立、專業、參與對企業績效及風險之影響

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