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題名：績效、公司治理與高階管理者離職關係之實證研究
書刊名：中山管理評論
作者：李佳玲 引用關係／葉穎蓉 引用關係／何晉滄
作者(外文)：Lee, Chia-ling／Yeh, Ying-jung／Ho, Chin-tsang
出版日期：2005
卷期：13:1
頁次：頁75-106
主題關鍵詞：高階管理者離職；高階管理者持股；公司治理；Top executive turnover；Corporate governance；Managerial ownership
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
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  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(21) 博士論文(4) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:21
  • 共同引用共同引用:7
  • 點閱點閱:67
從高階管理者離職探討公司治理效力是近來一重要議題，文獻指出有效的公司治理機制可發現高階管理者異動與公司績效呈負向關係，本文以臺灣上市公司為例，從高階管理者離職探討公司內部治理與外部治理之效力，首先係探討臺灣地區上市公司績效與管理者離職之關係，並檢定高階管理者離職後績效是否顯著改善，再檢視高階管理者持股、外部治療機制與績效之交互作用對高階管理者離職之影響，本文的高階管理者包括董事長與總經理。 本文發現，不良績效公司的高階管理者離職機率較高，且總經理離職之後，公司股價績效顯著改善，顯示市場對總經理離職有正向評價。然而，高階管理者持股比例降低績效與離職間之負向關係，本文以外部董事比、機構法人持股比及外部大股東代表外部治理，結果發現外部治理變數與董事長持股比之交互項無顯著負相關，此外，外部大股東對監督高階管理者扮演一重要角色，雖然高階管理者持股比與離職呈負相關，但外部大股東的存在，減緩總經理持股對離職的負向影響。
An issue, which has recently assumed importance, is the studying of the effectiveness of corporate governance from the point of top executive turnover. Published paper has shown that the likelihood of top executive turnover is negatively related to firm performance in effective corporate governance situation. This paper researches the effectiveness of internal corporate governance and external corporate governance in relation to top executive turnover in Taiwan stock-listed firms. First we test top executive turnover rate in relation to the firms performance. Furthermore, we examine the improvement in firm performance subsequent to top executive turnover. Finally, this paper tests the impact of the interaction of management ownership, external corporate governance and firm performance on top executive turnover. In our paper, the top executives include the president and the general manager. We find that the turnover rate of top executives is significantly higher in poorly performed corporations. However, after the general manager leaves, the stock price of the corporation is significantly higher. This result shows that investors respond well to general manager turnover in Taiwan stock-listed firms. As top executive ownership increases, the negative relationship between corporation performance and top executive turnover rate reduces. In this paper the external governance refers to external director ratio, institutional holding ratio, or external blockholders. The finding is that the interactions between the variables of the external governance and president’s ownership are not significantly negative. This represents that within our country the external governance system can weaken the negative. This represent that within our country the external governance system can weaken the negative effect of the president’s ownership on his turnover. Furthermore, external blockholders play a significant role in monitoring the general managers in the corporations. Although the amount of holding of stocks that the general mangers own are inversely related to their turnover, the existence of external major stock holder reduces the negative effect of general managers’ ownership.
期刊論文
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4.Kesner, I. F.、Victor, B.、Lamont, B. T.(1986)。Board Composition and the Commission of Illegal Acts: An Investigation of Fortune 500 Companies。Academy of Management Journal，29(4)，789-800。  new window
5.Gilson, Stuart C.(1990)。Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders: Evidence on changes in corporate ownership and control when firms default。Journal of Financial Economics，27(2)，355-387。  new window
6.Janakiraman, S. N.、Lambert, R. A.、Larcker, D. F.(1992)。An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation Hypothesis。Journal of Accounting Research，30(1)，53-69。  new window
7.Gibbons, Robert、Murphy, Kevin J.(1990)。Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers。Industrial and Labor Relations Review，43(3)，S30-S51。  new window
8.Clinch, G.(1991)。Employee Compensation and Firms' Research and Development Activity。Journal of Accounting Research，29(1)，59-78。  new window
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11.McConnell, John J.、Servaes, Henri(1990)。Additional Evidenceon Equity Ownership and Corporate Value。Journal of Financial Economics，27(2)，595-612。  new window
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15.Denis, D. J.、Denis, D. K.(1995)。Performance Changes Following Top Management Dismissals。The Journal of Finance，50(4)，1029-1058。  new window
16.倪豐裕、邱炳乾(20011200)。內外控人格特質和任務不確定性對參與式預算制度效能的影響。臺大管理論叢，12(1)，123-148。new window  延伸查詢new window
17.Hart, Oliver(1995)。Corporate Governance: some theory and implications。Economic Journal，105(430)，678-689。  new window
18.Dahya, J.、Lonie, A. A.、Power, D. M.(1998)。Ownership structure, firm performance and top executive change: an analysis of UK firms。Journal of Business Finance & Accounting，25(9/10)，1089-1118。  new window
19.Brickley, James A.、Lease, Ronald C.、Smith, Clifford W. Jr.(1988)。Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments。Journal of Financial Economics，20，267-291。  new window
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21.Morck, Randall、Shleifer, Andrei、Vishny, Robert W.(1989)。Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control。American Economic Review，79(4)，842-852。  new window
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29.Denis, David J.、Denis, Diane K.、Sarin, Atulya(1997)。Ownership Structure and Top Executive Turnover。Journal of Financial Economics，45(2)，193-221。  new window
30.Venkatraman, N.、Ramanujam, Vasudevan(1986)。Measurement of Business Performance in Strategy Research: A Comparison of Approaches。Academy of Management Review，11(4)，801-814。  new window
31.Jensen, Michael C.(1993)。The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems。The Journal of Finance，48(3)，831-880。  new window
32.Rechner, Paula L.(1989)。Corporate Governance: Fact or Fiction?。Business Horizons，32(4)，11-15。  new window
33.Kang, Jun-Koo、Shivdasani, Anil(1995)。Firm Performance, Corporate Governance, and Top Executive Turnover in Japan。Journal of Financial Economics，38(1)，29-58。  new window
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35.陳牡丹(1997)。上市公司經營權變動前後經營績效之實證研究。國立臺中技術學院學報，29。  延伸查詢new window
36.Abe, Y.(1997)。Chief executive turnover and firm performance in Japan。Journal of the Japanese and International Economics，11，2-26。  new window
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39.Franks, J.、Mayer, C.、Renneboog, L.(2001)。Who disciplines management in poorly performing companies?。Journal of Financial Intermediation，10，209-248。  new window
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會議論文
1.林穎芬、劉維琪(2000)。臺灣上市公司高階主管離職之研究。沒有紀錄。  延伸查詢new window
研究報告
1.徐木蘭、余坤東(1994)。企業經營者道德標準與企業倫理規範之關聯性研究 (計畫編號：NSC 83-0301-H-002-030)。臺北：行政院國家科學委員會。  延伸查詢new window
2.Khurana, R.、Nohria, N.(2002)。The performance consequences of CEO turnover。沒有紀錄。  new window
學位論文
1.陳金鈴(1997)。臺灣上市公司股權結構之研究分析(碩士論文)。國立成功大學，臺南。  延伸查詢new window
2.楊俊中(1998)。股權結構與經營績效相關性之研究(碩士論文)。國立臺灣大學。  延伸查詢new window
3.林紓瑋(2001)。公司監理、產品市場競爭程度與公司績效之關連性研究(碩士論文)。國立中正大學。  延伸查詢new window
4.陳家慧(2000)。我國上市公司管理機制與盈餘管理相關性之實證研究，沒有紀錄。  延伸查詢new window
5.賴汝鑑(1986)。我國民營企業高階管理者變動對公司價值的影響，沒有紀錄。  延伸查詢new window
 
 
 
 
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