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題名：政府與國立大學財務關係之研究：以主理代理理論觀點為例
作者：范麗雪
作者(外文)：Li-hsueh Fan
校院名稱：國立臺南大學
系所名稱：教育經營與管理研究所博士班
指導教授：姜麗娟
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2011
主題關鍵詞：國立大學；政府；主理代理理論；財務關係；高等教育；national university；government；principal-agent theory；financial relationship；higher education
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在過去的公務預算體系下，政府與國立大學有色彩濃厚的主理與代理關係，隨著1996年實施校務基金制度以後，大學的財務自主性漸增，也讓政府與國立大學間的主理與代理關係的色彩較不濃厚，然而政府仍舊對大學的經費使用採取許多控管與限制。因此，本研究以政府與國立大學的財務關係為研究焦點，以主理代理理論詮釋政府與大學關係、以及經費機制所意涵之政府與大學之主理與代理關係，並透過國內政府與大學財務關係之實證結果，驗證該理論在經費分配機制與經費規範等實務應用上的啟示及限制。本研究訪談政府單位主管、國立大學校長、與熟知高等教育財務與經營之學者等共13位受訪者。本研究獲致的主要結論如下：
一、主理代理理論可詮釋市場機制下的政府與大學關係及其衍生的代理問題
在資訊不對稱下，政府與大學之間產生「主理—代理問題」：政府（主理人）在分配經費給大學使用之後，要如何確保大學（代理人）的執行成果是政府所想要的。本研究發現以下現象：
（1）政府與大學有目標不一致之現象，故政府以績效導向的競爭性經費來激勵大學達成政府目標。
（2）若政府的競爭性計畫目標定義不清，將影響大學的計畫執行且不利於政府對大學的事後績效評估。
（3）政府透過嚴密的監督機制，來降低政府與大學間的資訊不對稱。
（4）由於資訊不對稱問題，若政府為了合理分配經費而設定的評鑑與審議指標不周全時，反而產生逆選擇問題。
（5）在資訊不對稱與目標不一致下，政府採取績效導向的經費分配方式，來降低道德危險問題。
二、主理代理理論可詮釋國內政府與大學之財務關係及其衍生的代理問題
國內政府在提高國立大學的財務自主性之後，也擔心大學經費使用的代理問題，故政府定期辦理大學評鑑以監督大學成效，並透過嚴密的經費使用規範來監督大學，以及採競爭性經費來引導大學行為。本研究發現以下現象：
（1）政府沒有配合大學財務自主的政策目標來創造合適的經費法規，反而讓繁瑣的經費規範綑綁了大學的經費運用。
（2）政府在經費規範上偏重經費運用的監督，對於經費績效的監督規範較少。
（3）經費規範偏重於防弊性監督，缺乏獎勵與誘因。
（4）政府在競爭性經費分配過程不透明，影響了政府與大學間的互信關係。
（5）競爭性經費激勵大學更加努力，但不公平的經費分配影響大學的功能與整體發展。
（6）競爭性經費雖有利於大學朝向政府目標，但也影響大學內部的風險偏好，偏向於努力可具體衡量的產出，易忽視了難以衡量的產出面向。
三、因著不同經費來源與經費規範，政府與大學間出現不同的主理與代理關係
（1）基本需求經費是政府提供給大學的基本生存經費，相對於競爭性經費積極的要求大學績效，政府在基本需求經費並不積極要求大學要達到何種明確的績效目標，故政府與大學間形成了「消極的主理人vs. 自主的代理人」關係。
（2）政府以競爭性經費積極引導大學提昇競爭力，而大學也積極爭取經費並對政府目標有所回應，故政府與大學之間形成了「聰明的主理人vs. 回應的代理人」關係。
（3）政府對大學的經費運用，採取如蜘蛛網般的經費規範來監督大學，而大學對經費運用規範的綑綁相當地無奈，故政府與大學之間形成了「蛛網的主理人vs. 無奈的代理人」關係。
基於此，本研究的主要論點為：以主理代理理論分析政府與國立大學之財務關係，可釐清近年來政府與大學在準市場競爭機制下的微妙互動，而政府與大學之間唯有降低資訊不對稱與建立互信，才能在有效互動下共同促進高等教育競爭力的提昇。最後，則依據研究結果與結論，對政府、國立大學與後續研究提出建議，以及提出研究者的省思。
The role of strong principal and agent role in the relationship between government and national universities existed in the traditional civil affairs budgeting system. National universities were granted more autonomy following the introduction of university fund system in 1996. However, the government still utilizes many control mechanisms to monitor the behavior of universities to act to comply with government goals. The study aims to use principal-agent theory to examine the financial relationship between government and national universities and to explore the implication of the theory in Taiwanese higher education funding mechanism empirically. This paper was based on semi-structured interviews with 13 interviewees, including government officers, principals of national university and scholars in higher education field. The main conclusions are as follows:
I. Principal-agent theory is applicable to interpret the government-university relationship and to clarify agency problems.
Under the condition of informational asymmetries, there exists the principal-agent problem: how does the principal (the government) get the agent (the national universities) to act in accordance with the desires of the principal? The study results point out the following phenomena:
1. Government employs the competitive funding to align the goals of universities and the ones of the government.
2. The ambiguity of government goals will lead to the difficulty of the assessment of universities’ performance.
3. Government reduces the inherent informational asymmetries in the higher education system through the web of monitor mechanism.
4. The incompleteness of assessment indicators in funding allocation will in turn lead to the problem of adverse selection.
5. Government employs the performance-based funding to lessen the moral hazard problem.
II. Principal-agent theory is applicable to interpret the financial relationship between Taiwanese government and national university and to clarify the agency problems.
After the rising of financial autonomy in higher education, government has to rely on a complex array of monitor mechanism and other administrative and procedural requirements to reduce some of the agency problems. The study results point out the following phenomena:
1. Government does not create proper regulations to complement financial autonomy, but to restrict the funding operation instead.
2. Funding regulations emphasize the procedure monitor instead of university performance.
3. Funding regulations emphasize corruption-proof monitor mechanism instead of incentive mechanism.
4. The less transparent in the process of competitive funding allocation will impact on the trust between government and universities.
5. Performance-based funding tends to bring about positive effects on the efficiency of the universities; however, it also has side effects on university development.
6. While performance-based funding is thought to enhance universities to act to comply with government goals, the efforts of universities will be biased towards activities that increase measured parts of output and ignore unmeasured dimensions.
III. The study results reveal different types of agency relationship between government and universities according to diverse funding and regulation.
1. Need-based funding in provided to support the fundamental funding for national universities, and therefore forms the‘passive principal vs. autonomous agent’ relationship.
2. National universities become more responsive to government goals in the scheme of performance-based funding, and therefore form the‘wise principal vs. responsive agent’relationship.
3. Government adopts the web of funding regulations to monitor the behavior of universities, and therefore forms the‘webbed principal vs. binding agent’relationship.
The main argument of this study is that principal-agent theory provides a useful conceptual lens through which to examine the government-university financial relationship, and accordingly to suggest that the decrease of informational asymmetries and trust between government and national universities are vital in improving the competitiveness of the universities. Based on the findings, finally, suggestions for the government, national universities and further study are provided and the researcher’s reflection is made.
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