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題名：獨立董事機制與企業經營成敗關係之研究
作者：徐傳瑛 引用關係
作者(外文)：Chuan-Ying Hsu
校院名稱：國立雲林科技大學
系所名稱：管理研究所博士班
指導教授：李春安
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2009
主題關鍵詞：獨立董事；財務危機；忙碌董事；公司績效；融資受限；Financial Distress；Independent Director；Financial Constraint；Busy Director；Firm Performance
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
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本研究主要探討我國獨立董事機制對企業經營消極面與積極面的影響。首先，檢測董事會獨立性對企業財務危機是否具備防弊效力。實證結果顯示，對曾經發生過被掏空資產的財務危機公司而言，獨立董事比率及控制股東的控制權，皆能有效解釋資產掏空案的發生；對非掏空類型的財務危機而言，則是以董事長不兼任總經理及降低控制權與現金流量請求權之間的偏離程度，才會有明顯遏阻危機發生的效果。
其次，本研究探討獨立董事特性對企業投資與經營績效是否具備興利效力。先就忙碌(具3席位以上)的獨立董事與公司績效進行驗證，再就獨立董事監督對投資支出與經營績效的影響加以剖析。實證結果顯示，獨立董事席位愈多(可表徵聲譽較佳)，公司績效愈佳。然而，這顯著的正向關係，隨著董事席次的增加會逐漸減弱。此外，在公司融資受限較低的情形下，獨立董事監督對於投資支出的提昇與經營績效的改善均有正向效果；在公司融資受限較高的情形下，獨立董事監督可以降低代理問題，使投資對現金流量的敏感度較高。
This study investigates the effect of the independent director mechanism on financial distress and firm performance using a sample of Taiwan listed firms. At first, our evidence indicates that the larger proportions of independent directors and the higher control right of controlling stockholders may lower the incidence of financial crisis for expropriated-assets firms. Among non-expropriated assets firms, the key factors that reduce the likelihood of financial distress are the independent leadership of a board’s chairman and the lower deviation in control away from cash flow rights.
In addition, this study explores the effect of an independent director’s characteristics on firm performance. Our findings show that a director’s reputation for being busy is significantly related to improving firm performance. However, this positive relationship gradually declines as more board seats pass to independent directors. Finally, this study supports the assertion that the introduction of the independent director mechanism in Taiwan improves investment behavior and firm performance among firms with few financial constraints. In firms with many financial constraints, we empirically find that the adoption of independent directors may lower the agency problem, thus resulting in higher investment sensitivity to cash flow.
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