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題名：薪酬委員會與經理人薪酬：政治成本、遵循意圖與委員會組成之檢測
作者：余俊憲
作者(外文)：Yu, Chun-Hsien
校院名稱：國立臺北大學
系所名稱：會計學系
指導教授：王怡心
汪進揚
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2013
主題關鍵詞：薪酬委員會；超額薪酬；政治成本；遵循意圖；compensation committee；excess compensation；political cost；compliance intention
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本研究主要在於探討薪酬委員會與經理人薪酬之關係，特別聚焦於薪酬委員會設置與特性(政治成本、制度遵循意圖、及委員會組成)面向對經理人超額薪酬之影響。薪酬委員會的設置目的主要在於健全公司薪資報酬制度，使經理人薪酬更為合理，因此本研究推論，在薪酬委員會設置後，經理人超額薪酬較低、較具合理性。另外，當公司政治成本較高(較容易被嚴格要求適用相關規範)、遵循意圖較強、委員較專業與獨立時，經理人薪酬較為合理(超額薪酬較低)。
為驗證上述之推論，本研究以台灣上市公司為研究對象，採用2009至2012年實際資料，以單變量與多變量統計分析方法進行實證。研究結果支持，當公司政治成本較高、制度遵循意圖較強、以及有聘用外部專家時，經理人超額薪酬較低(較為合理)。另外在薪酬委員會要求設置部分，對經理人薪酬並無顯著的統計影響，本研究推測可能是公司在設置初期，制度運作未臻完善，較難對經理人薪酬發揮顯著影響。
整體言，本研究提出了政治成本、制度遵循意圖及委員會組成對公司經理人薪酬合理性影響之證據，研究結果除增添此研究領域之理論內涵外，亦提供政策制定者有用資訊，以作為未來薪酬政策修訂之參考。
This study aims to explore the relationship between compensation committee and management compensation. Specifically, I examine the impact of establishment and characteristics of the committee on excess management compensation. Since the committee is set up to improve the fairness of management compensation, I expect that abnormal management compensation will be reduced after the establishment of the committee, and that the higher political cost, compliance intention, committee profession as well as independence a company experiences, the lower excess compensation its management receives.
To examine the above expectations, I use a sample of firms trading in Taiwan Securities Exchange between 2009 and 2012. My findings lend support to the expectations, showing that excess management compensation is reduced when companies experience higher political cost and stronger intention of law compliance, and when their compensation committees have new outside expert members. As to the establishment of the committee, the empirical evidence shows an insignificant result. This study conjectures that the compensation system doesn’t work smoothly in the beginning period and the committee has less effect on the management compensation.
Taken together, this study finds the evidence that political cost, law compliance intention, and committee composition can affect management compensation fairness. Such findings enrich the theoretical base in the area of management compensation, and convey helpful information to the policy maker.
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