As an admirer of the work of Pierre Bourdieu, I always wonder how he keeps the extreme delicate balance between dualisms of determinism/action, habitus/pratice, subjectivism/objectivism, and last but not the very least, economism(interest)/cultural distinction(disinterestedness). This work is another test cast of showing how his sophisticated balance is accomplished, claiming another prestige across sociological field in particular, and academic field in general. The aim of this paper is to explore Bourdieu's theory of culture(Distinction) in terms of his vulgar critique of Kant's aesthetics. Through vulgar critique, we are presented two different models of culture, namely, artistic judgment of genius with inborn cultural endowment(Kant) vs. artistic judgment conditioned by and conditioning social relation of existence(economy). Special focus would be to reveal the theoretical implications of vulgar critique. To my understanding, vulgar critique conveys two seemingly contradictory senses and implications, namely, on the one hand, as an external critique, it reveals the sociological conditions of aesthetic purity, yet leaving the legitimacy of high arts intact. On the other hand, as an internal critique, it reveals that the ground of the aesthetic legitimacy does not lie on the gifted individuals endowed with natural distinction who, accordingly, are able to uncover the essence of beauty; instead, the ground of asethetic legitimacy lies on cultural habitus made possible by the distance from necessity. Likewise, aesthetic legitimacy is not static, timeless and essential. As objective social relations of existence changes, aesthetic legitimacy change as well. However can vulgar critique be both an external critique and an internal critique? Is it a self-contradictory project? or a highly sophisticated theoretical strategy? Without doubt, vulgar critique is another case testing whether or not Bourdieu can keep sophisticated balance between the seemingly contradictory positions. In the last part of this paper, I will present three perspectives questioning Bourdieu's vulgar critique, they are, (1)pragmatist aesthetics of R. Shusterman criticizing vulgar critique of failing to legitimize popular or low arts; (2)neo-marxism of David Gartman criticizing vulgar critique as sociological reductionism, dismantling culture's social reformation function; and (3)modernism of Andrew Sayer criticizing vulgar critique as "uncritical social sciences", for Bourdieu's suspicion of disinterested and normative judgments leaves no room for social betterment and progress. In the end, I will conclude this paper, in Bourdieu's own terms, by responding to the above three objections of vulgar critique. All in all, I would argue that they all fail in their attempt to criticize vulgar critique. Neither is vulgar critique an one-sided sociological reductionism, nor is it self-conflicting. On the very contrary, I will show that once they, in fact, acknowledge and appreciate the importance of habitus and social conditions of culture, their perspectives become complements rather than critique of Bourdieu's theory of culture. In other words, once admitting the brilliance of Bourdieu's theory of culture as they all did, their models of culture are assimilated in Bourdieu's culture theory. The latter entails the former, but not vice versa.