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題名：公司內部治理機制與公司績效之關係--股權結構與董事會特性的觀點
書刊名：輔仁管理評論
作者：洪榮華 引用關係／陳香如 引用關係／王玉珍
作者(外文)：Hung, Jung-hua／Chen, Hsiang-ju／Wang, Yu-chen
出版日期：2005
卷期：12:3
頁次：頁23-40
主題關鍵詞：公司治理；公司績效；股權結構；董事會特性；資本結構；Ownership structure；Board characteristics；Corporate performance；Fixed or random effects model
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
相關次數：
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(26) 博士論文(8) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:26
  • 共同引用共同引用:124
  • 點閱點閱:107
本文主要探討國內上市公司之股權結構、董事會特性等內部治理機制與公司績效間的關係，研究期間為1995至2000年，共有477個觀察值。先以產業特性分群進行單變量分析發現：不論會計或市場績效指標，高科技產業均高於傳統產業，內部人持股率、負債比率與董監事酬勞等治理機制，也在產業間有不同的水準。再依統計檢定決定採用固定效果或隨機效果模型進行估計，發現五種績效代理變數模型的結果大致相近：內部人持股率和公司績效間呈先降後升的非線性關係，大股東持股率、外部董事長比例等顯著為正，股權集中度、機構人持股率、領導結構等顯著為負。唯有董事會規模，會計指標與市場指標有相反的符號。另外，控制變數負債比率、董監事酬勞等治理機制與公司績效亦有正向關係。
This paper examines the relationships between internal governance mechanisms, ownership structure and board characteristics, as well as corporate performance of listed firms in Taiwan. The sample contains 477 observations for the 1995 to 2000 period. In the univariate analysis, we found that whether using accounting or market performance proxies, high-tech industries outperformed traditional industries. There also significant differences in insider ownership, debt ratio and board compensation between the two groups. We selected the fixed effects model or random effects model based on test statistics. The empirical results from five performance models using different performance proxies are similar. The relationship between insider ownership and performance is non-linear. Blockholder ownership and outside directors’ proportion are significantly positive and ownership concentration, institutional ownership and duality are significantly negative. Only board size shows conflicting results between the accounting and market proxy models. Control governance mechanisms, debt ratio and board compensation, are significantly positive in relation to corporate performance.
期刊論文
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圖書
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3.Pfeffer, Jeffrey、Salancik, Gerald Richard(1978)。The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective。Harper & Row。  new window
4.Hsiao, Cheng(1986)。Analysis of Panel Data。Cambridge University Press。  new window
 
 
 
 
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